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This Comment asserts that although the Court of Justice may not have employed well-defined
judicial principles, Marshall II nevertheless harmonizes the application of the Equal Treatment
Directive in Member State courts. Part I explores how directives are enacted by the Council and
enforced by the Court of Justice. In addition, Part I discusses the Equal Treatment Directive, as
well as Marshall I , the precursor to Marshall II. Part II sets forth the factual and procedural history
of Marshall II and examines the opinion of the Court. Part III argues that the Court of Justice, in
Marshall II, engaged in judicial activism to significantly increase the power of the Equal Treatment
Directive. This Comment concludes that Marshall II promotes uniformity in the remedies that
individuals receive for their Member States’ violations of the Equal Treatment Directive.
COMMENT
MARSHALL /: ENHANCING THE REMEDY AVAILABLE TO
INDIVIDUALS FOR GENDER DISCRIMINATION IN THE EC
Gina L. Ziccolella*
INTRODUCTION
One of the founding tenets of the Treaty of Rome1 ("EEC
Treaty"), recently recodified in the Treaty Establishing the Euro-
pean Community2 ("EC Treaty"), was the promotion of eco-
nomic efficiency and strength within each Member State of the
European Community3 ("Community" or "EC"). Part of this
economic efficiency encompassed improving the standard of liv-
ing and working conditions for individuals who lived within the
EC Member States' boundaries.4 The improvement of living and
working conditions included strengthening the ec9nomic inde-
* J.D. Candidate, 1995, Fordham University.
1. Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 298
U.N.T.S. 11, 1973 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 1 (Cmd. 5179-I) [hereinafter EEC Treaty], as
amended by Single European Act, O.J. L 169/1 (1987), [1987] 2 C.M.L.R. 741 [hereinaf-
ter SEA], in TREATES ESrABUSHING THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES (EC Off'l Pub. Off.
1987).
2. Treaty Establishing the European Community, Feb. 7. 1992, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R.
573 [hereinafter EC Treaty], incorporating changes made y Treaty on European Union,
Feb. 7, 1992, O.J. C 224/1 (1992), [1992] 1 C.M.L.P. 719, 31 I.L.M. 247 [hereinafter
TEU]. The TEU, supra, amended the EEC Treaty, supra note 1. The twelve current EC
Member States are Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Spain, France, Ireland, Italy,
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, and the United Kingdom. Id. As ofJanuary 1,
1994, Austria, Finland, and Sweden will also become Member States. See Hugh
Carnegy, Sweden Gives Clear Yes to EU Vote in Favour of Membership Keeps Enlargement
Timetable on Course, FIN. TiMEs, Nov. 14, 1994, at 1 (discussing accession of new states).
The enlarged Community will not include Norway, which rejected membership in the
Community in November 1994. John Darton, Vote in Norway Blocks Joining Europe's
Union, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 29, 1994, at Al.
3. EEC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 2. Article 2 of the EEC Treaty stated:
It shall be the aim of the Community, by establishing a common market
and progressively approximating the economic policies of Member States, to
promote throughout the Community a harmonious development of economic
activities, a continuous and balanced expansion, an increased stability, an ac-
celerated raising of the standard of living and closer relations between its
Member States.
Id. This article was amended in the EC Treaty to refer to an economic and monetary
union. EC Treaty, supra note 2, art. 2.
4. See EEC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 117, which stated:
Member States agree upon the need to promote improved working condi-
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pendence of women.5 Toward this end, Article 119 of the EC
Treaty mandates equal pay for equal work.6
In the late 1960's, however, the Commission of the Euro-
tions and an improved standard of living for workers, so as to make possible
their harmonization while the improvement is being maintained.
They believe that such a development will ensue not only from the func-
tioning of the common market, which will favour the harmonization of social
systems, but also from the procedures provided for in this Treaty and from the
approximation of provisions laid down by law, regulation or administrative ac-
tion.
Id.
5. Id. art. 119; see R. Mace Flournoy, Gender Discrimination - European Economic
Community - European Court ofJustice Determines That a Non-Contributory Occupational Pen-
sion Scheme Should Not Discriminate on the Basis of Sex: Barber v. Royal Exchange Assurance
Group, 21 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 257 (discussing view that equality between men and
women in area of employment is founding principle of EEC Treaty); see also Cathryn L.
Claussen, Incorporating Women's Reality into Legal Neutrality in the European Community: The
Sex Segregation of Labor and the Wo*-Family Nexus, 22 LAw & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 787 (1991)
(stating that "[o]riginally, the 1957 Treaty of Rome, with an eye toward preventing the
exploitation of lower paid female labor by competing nations, mandated equal pay for
women").
6. EC Treaty, supra note 2, art. 119; see Roger J. Goebel, Employee Rights in the
European Community: A Panorama From the 1974 Social Action Program To The Social Charter
of 1989, 17 HAsrINGs INT'L & COMp. L. REv. 1 (1993). Professor Goebel characterizes
Article 119 in the following manner
Article 119 is surprising in several respects. First of all, it is a highly spe-
cific assertion of a social goal, as opposed to the much more general language
of article 117. Secondly, it is one of the very few instances in the Treaty where
a basic human right is expressly stated. Third, it represented a definite com-
mitment to take action to achieve the goal by 1962, which was the end of the
'first stage' within which the Treaty was to be implemented. Finally, although
article 119 is quite precise in setting out a broad definition of what constitutes
pay, nonetheless it is narrow in limiting the goal of equality between the sexes
to 'pay,' as opposed to work conditions generally....
It is interesting to note that article 119 was requested by France, largely to
ensure that its business enterprises, which were bound by the French Constitu-
tion to provide equal pay for women, should not be at a competitive disadvan-
tage compared with firms in other Member States that did not require equality
in pay. Thus, social directives adopted by article 119 have always been linked
to the goal of achieving a level competitive playing field within the common
market.
Id. at 29. While some of the drafters of the EEC Treaty believed that equal treatment
would naturally occur as economic and social progress was made, other drafters be-
lieved that legislative measures would be necessary to fully achieve this goal. See EC
Treaty, supra note 1, art. 117 ("Member States agree upon the need to promote im-
proved working conditions and an improved standard of living for working conditions
and an improved standard of living for workers, so as to make possible their harmoniza-
tion while the improvement is being made."); see also supra note 3 (setting forth full text
of Article 117); Goebel, supra, at 8 (stating that some Member States felt that economic
progress in attaining common market would provide inevitable accompanying benefits
to workers, so that specific social legislation would be "superfluous").
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pean Communities 7 (the "Commission") concluded that the
EEC Treaty was inadequate to meet desired social policies with-
out amplification through legislative measures.' During the
1969 Hague Conference,9 the Commission recommended that
the Community adopt a uniform social policy.10 In 1972, the
Heads of State" of the EC Member States confirmed the Coin-
7. See EC Treaty, supra note 2, art. 155. Article 155 delineates the Commission's
role in the Community, stating.
In order to ensure the proper functioning and development of the com-
mon market, the Commission shall:
- ensure that the provisions of this Treaty and the measures taken by
the institutions pursuant thereto are applied;
- formulate recommendations or deliver opinions on matters dealt with
in the Treaty, where the latter expressly so provides or if the Commission con-
siders it necessary;
- have its own power of decision and participate in shaping of the meas-
ures taken by the Council and by the European Parliament in the manner
provided for in this Treaty;,
- exercise the powers conferred on it by the Council for the implemen-
tation of the rules laid down by the latter.
Id.; see GEORGE A. BERMANN Er AL., CASES AND MATERIAL ON EUROPEAN COMMUNrIY LAW
(1993). The Commission performs tasks that are executive in nature. Id. at 57. The
Commission formulates general legislative programs, initiates the legislative process by
drafting specific pieces of legislation, and carries out the administrative duties it has
been assigned, including ensuring compliance with the laws of the European Commu-
nity. Id. at 58. One of the Commission's goals is to introduce proposals that will fur-
ther the interest of the Community. Id.; see Utz. P Toepke, The European Economic Com-
munity - A Profile, 3 N.W.J. INT'L L. & Bus. 640, 646 (1981) (stating that Commission's
primary task is to draw up proposals to further interests of Community).
8. Council Resolution of 21 January 1974, O.J. C 13/1, at 4, 1 8 (1974) (concern-
ing Social Action Program); see LABOR, WORKING CONDITIONS, SOCIAL SECURIY, [1974]
Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 1 3900, at 3153 (stating that social action program was
adopted on January 21, 1974) [hereinafter WORKING CONDrIONS].
9. See WORKING CoNDrIoNs, supra note 8, 1 3901 (noting that Hague Conference
was held to check status of Community).
10. Albert Coppe, The Social Horizon for 1980, 4 E.C. BuLLu, no. 1, at 11 (1971).
Albert Coppe characterized the social action program by stating that
[t]he goal of social policy must be to promote optimal employment, to dis-
tribute more fairly the fruits of growth, to improve living and working condi-
tions, to protect health and the environment, to ensure effective participation
by all in both individual and in social progress
Id.; see WORKING CoNDITIONs, supra note 8, 1 3901 (discussing Commission's findings
that EEC Treaty was inadequate to achieve equal treatment of sexes without amplifica-
tion through legislation); see also Margaret Foldes, The Final Directive: Equal Social Secur-
ity Benefits for Men and Women in the European Economic Community, 12 B.C. INT'L & COMP.
L. Ray. 437, 439 (stating Commission found that harmonizing social policies required
formal action).
11. See Goebel, supra note 6, at 7. Goebel explains the history of the role of the
heads of government in the Community as follows:
Since 1969, when President Pompidou of France invited the other Mem-
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mission's findings and proposed that the Community draft and
implement a common social program. 2 In 1974, the Council Of
Ministers (the "Council")'s adopted a Social Action Program, 14
which had three main objectives:15 (1) full and better employ-
ber States' heads of government to meet to discuss major policy issues affect-
ing the Community, these gatherings, initially called sumnmit meetings and
now referred to as meetings of the European Council, have assumed great
importance in Community decision-making....
[T he 1972 Paris summit of the heads of government was one of the most
significant meetings of this body in the history of the Community. Among the
key decisions made at this summit meeting was the decision to initiate Com-
munity action in the sphere of social policy. The Commission in 1971 had
urged a Community social action program to supplement current policies in
the economic sphere.
Id.
12. COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, SEVENTH GENERAL REPORT ON AC-
TIVITIES OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES 208 (1973); see Goebel, supra note 6, at 7 (stat-
ing that 1972 Paris summit meeting was one of most significant meetings in history of
Community, where decision was made to initiate Community action in sphere of social
policy).
13. See EC Treaty, supra note 2, art. 145. According to Article 145, the Council
shall:
- ensure coordination of the general economic policies of the Member
States;
have power to take decisions;
- confer on the Commission, in the acts which the Council adopts, pow-
ers for the implementation of the rules which the Council lays down. The
Council may impose certain requirements in respect of the exercise of these
powers. The Council may also reserve the right, in specific cases, to exercise
directly implementing powers itself. The procedures referred to above must
be consonant with principles and rules to be laid down in advance by the
Council, acting unanimously on a proposal from the Commission and after
obtaining the Opinion of the European Parliament.
Id.; see BErN T AL., supra note 7, at 58 (stating that Council's most prominent
function has been coordinating Member State foreign policy).
14. Council Resolution of 21January 1974, supra note 8, OJ. C 13/1 (1974). This
resolution represented the first effort by the EC to promote various types of social ac-
tion. Goebel, supra note 6, at 8 (stating that Social Action Program was designed to
achieve social policies desired by Community).
15. Council Resolution of 21 January 1974, supra note 8, OJ. C 13/1 (1974). The
Council Resolution concerning a social action program states that the Council
[c] onsiders that vigorous action must be undertaken in successive stages with a
view to realising the social aims of European union, in order to attain the
following broad objectives: full and better employment at Community, na-
tional and regional levels, which is an essential condition for an effective social
policy, improvement of living and working conditions so as to make possible
their harmonisation while the improvement is being maintained; increased
involvement of management and labour in the economic and social decisions
of the Community, and of workers in the life of undertakings.
Id. at 1-2.
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ment in the Community;16 (2) improved living and working con-
ditions; 7 and (3) greater industrial democracy and worker par-
ticipation.' 8 The goals set forth in the second objective on im-
proved living and working conditions included steps to establish
equal treatment of the sexes in the area of employment.' 9
Pursuant to the Social Action Program, the Council passed
several directives20 to ensure that men and women were treated
equally in the workplace. 2' One such Council directive was the
Equal Treatment Directive22 (or "Directive"), mandating equal
working conditions and dismissal policies for men and women.23
16. Id; see WORKING CONDITIONS, supra note 8, 1 3900. The Social Action Program
gives the national governments and the Community the responsibility of ensuring full
employment through economic and financial policies. Id. 3901.03. These measures
include cooperation between national employment services, a vocational training pro-
gram, national schemes to ensure income maintenance during periods of retraining
and job search, measures to ensure equality between men and women in employment,
an action program for migrant workers, a long-term program for the social reintegra-
tion of handicapped people, and better supervision of activities of temporary work
agencies. Id.
17. Id 13900. Although the Commission is not seeking a uniform EC regime or
the elimination of disparities resulting from different national priorities, needs, and
values, it does want to establish minimum standards of social protection that can be
improved on a regular basis. Id. 1 3901.05. Furthermore, there are certain underprivi-
leged groups within the EC that must be given social priority. Id.
18. Id. The Social Action Program recognizes the need for greater participation of
labor and management in the decision-making process at the Community level. Id.
3901.07. Importance is also attached to the issue of worker participation in industry.
LI
19. Id. 1 3900. Equal pay for men and women and uniform paid holidays were
deemed to be particularly important to the development of EC social policy. Id. The
Court ofJustice has ruled that the principle of equal pay has been directly applicable in
the Community sinceJanuary 1, 1962 for the original Member States, and since January
1, 1973 for the new Member States. Id&
20. EC Treaty, supra note 2, art. 189. Directives are legislation passed by the Coun-
cil or Commission. Toepke, supra note 7, at 645. In effect, directives are one of the
tools that form the European Community's law. Id. Once a directive is adopted by the
Community, each Member State must implement that directive. BERMANN ET AL., supra
note 7, at 75. Directives are binding only as to the results to be achieved, and Member
States are free to choose the form or methods necessary for achieving the desired re-
sults. Id.
21. See, e.g., Council Directive No. 75/117, OJ. L 45/19 (1975) (stating that Equal
Pay Directive gives precise requirements necessary for Member States to achieve princi-
ples set forth in Article 119); Council Directive No. 79/7, 22 OJ. L 6/24 (1979) (requir-
ing Member States to implement social security schemes that are non-discriminatory).
The institutions of the Community implemented equality directives to clarify any ambi-
guities that had resulted from Article 119. Flournoy, supra note 5, at 260.
22. Council Directive No. 76/207, OJ. L 39/40 (1976) [hereinafter Equal Treat-
ment Directive].
23. Id. art. 5, OJ. L 39/40, at 41 (1976). The Equal Treatment Directive states that
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The Equal Treatment Directive provides that Member States
shall set up ajudicial process by which individuals who claim that
they have been victims of gender discrimination may pursue
their allegations against their employer in their Member States'
national court systems.2 4
In Marshall v. Southampton and South West Hampshire Health
Authority25 ("Marshall I), the Court of Justice26 (or "Court")
firmly established the principle that the Equal Treatment Direc-
tive entitles an individual to sue his Member State when the
Member State is acting in its capacity as an employer. The case
returned to the Court through a preliminary reference from the
House of Lords in Marshall v. Southampton and South West Hamp-
shire Health Authority 1l2' ("Marshall II"). In Marshall I, the
Court held that Article 6 of the Equal Treatment Directive man-
dates that when monetary damages are awarded for violations of
the Equal Treatment Directive, that award must be equal to the
actual damages suffered, as calculated by the individual's na-
tional court.29 Specifically, in Marshall II, the Court held that an
upper statutory limit on the damages available for violations of
the Equal Treatment Directive contradicted Article 6 of the
"[a]pplication of the principle of equal treatment with regard to working conditions,
including the conditions governing dismissal, means that men and women shall be
guaranteed the same conditions without discrimination on the grounds of sex." I&L
24. Id. art. 6, O.J. 39/40, at 41 (1976). Article 6 of the Equal Treatment Directive
states:
Member States shall introduce into their national legal systems such measures
as are necessary to enable all persons who consider themselves wronged by
failure to apply to them the principle of equal treatment within the meaning
of Articles 3, 4 and 5 to pursue their claims by judicial process, possibly after
recourse to other competent authorities.
Id,
25. Case 152/84, [1986] E.C.R. 723, [1986] 1 C.M.L.R 688 [hereinafter Marshall
I].
26. See EC Treaty, supra note 2, art. 164. Article 164 entrusts the Court ofJustice to
ensure that in the interpretation and application of the Treaty the law is observed. Id.;
see B rRmANN ET AL., supra note 7, at 69. The Court of Justice entertains legal actions
both against the institutions and against the Member States for their alleged nonobserv-
ance of Community law. Id.
27. Id.
28. Case 271/91, [1993] E.C.R. -, [1993] 3 C.M.L.R. 293 (Eur. Ct.J.) [hereinaf-
ter Marshall I] (Some of the written observations submitted to the court in Marshall II
were not republished in the C.M.L.R. Until the E.C.R. version is published, those un-
published portions are available on LEXIS, Eurcom Library, Cases File.); see EC Treaty,
supra note 2, art. 177(b) (giving Courtjurisdiction to issue preliminary rulings concern-
ing interpretation of acts of EC institutions).
29. Id
Equal Treatment Directive."0
This Comment asserts that although the Court of Justice
may not have employed well-defined judicial principles, Marshall
11 nevertheless harmonizes the application of the Equal Treat-
ment Directive in Member State courts. Part I explores how di-
rectives are enacted by the Council and enforced by the Court of
Justice. In addition, Part I discusses the Equal Treatment Direc-
tive, as well as Marshall I, the precursor to Marshall I. Part II sets
forth the factual and procedural history of Marshall i and exam-
ines the opinion of the Court. Part III argues that the Court of
Justice, in Marshall 1, engaged injudicial activism to significantly
increase the power of the Equal Treatment Directive. This Com-
ment concludes that Marshall if promotes uniformity in the rem-
edies that individuals receive for their Member States' violations
of the Equal Treatment Directive.
I. EC LEGISLATION TO ACHIEVE EQUAL TREATMENT IN
THE WORKPLACE
Directives are legislative enactments the objectives of which
the Community deems important.8 ' Once passed, a directive re-
quires the Member States to implement national legislation
designed to achieve the social policy set forth by the directive.
3 2
Generally, an individual may not rely on a directive as a basis for
a claim.8 Under certain circumstances, however, even if the
Member State has not yet adopted national legislation or if the
Member State has adopted the directive improperly, individuals
may bring a claim against their Member State, in their national
court system, to enforce the directive. 4 This principle is termed
30. Id. at 293.
31. EC Treaty, supra note 2, art. 189. Article 189, which sets forth the binding
nature of directives, states:
In order to carry out their task and in accordance with the provisions of
this Treaty, the European Parliament acting jointly with the Council, and the
Council and the Commission shall make regulations, issue directives, take de-
cisions, make recommendations or deliver opinions....
A directive shall be binding, as to the result to be achieved, upon each
[Member State] to which it is addressed, but shall leave to the national author-
ities the choice of form and methods.
Id.
32. Id.
33. See Toepke, supra note 7, at 651 (discussing under what circumstances natural
or legal person may bring case to Court of Justice).
34. See Van Gend & Loos v. Nederlandse Administratie der Belastingen, Case 26/
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vertical direct effect and was first articulated with respect to the
Equal Treatment Directive in Marshall I.1 Marshall I held that
an individual may bring a claim in her national court system
against the Member State when the Member State is acting in its
capacity as an employer. 36 The determination of damages avail-
able for violations of the Equal Treatment Directive by the Mem-
ber States prior to Marshall II, however, had been relegated to
the individual Member States."
A. EC Directives: Formulating Uniform Policies in the EC
EC institutions enact directives to forward the social agenda
desired by the Community."8 Directives are interpreted and en-
forced in the Member States through the Court of Justice. 9
The Court of Justice often determines, by means of a prelimi-
nary ruling, whether a Member State has violated or failed to
fully implement a directive.40
62, [1963] E.C.R. 1, 13 [1963] C.M.L.R. 105, 130-31 (holding for first time that EEC
Treaty was directly applicable in all Member States regardless of whether Member State
implemented legislation designed to meet requirements set forth in EEC Treaty); see
also Becker v. Finanzamt Minster-Innenstadt, Case 8/81, [1982] 1 E.C.R. 53, [1982] 1
C.M.L.R. 499 (discussing doctrine of vertical direct effect, which allows individual to
rely on provision of directive in individual's national court system if Court of Justice
determines that provision of directive is sufficiently precise and individual's claim is
against Member State government, rather than private citizen).
35. Marshall I, Case 152/84, [1986] E.C.R. 723, [1986] 1 C.M.L.R. 688.
36. Id.
37. Von Colson and Kamann v. Land Nordrhein-Westfalen, Case 14/83, [1984]
E.C.R. 1891, [1986] 2 C.M.L.R. 430 (holding that individual's Member State can decide
level of damages to which individual is entitled for violations of Equal Treatment Direc-
tive).
38. See BERmANN ET AL., supra note 7, at 75. A directive
is a more distinctive measure, defined as 'binding' only as to result but not as
to 'the choice of form and methods.' In theory, a directive (which takes effect
when communicated to the Member States) calls upon the Member States to
take the legislative and/or administrative action needed to implement the di-
rective's purposes. Although a directive does not have to be very detailed, in
practice directives are often quite specific as to how they are to be imple-
mented.
Id.; see Toepke, supra note 7, at 655 (describing binding nature of directives).
39. EC Treaty, supra note 2, art. 164 (establishing duties of Court of Justice).
40. See id. art. 177. Article 177 states in part:
The Court of Justice shall have jurisdiction to give preliminary rulings
concerning:
(a) the interpretation of this Treaty;
(b) the validity and interpretation of acts of the institutions of the Com-
munity and of the ECB;
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Articles 10041 and 2354 of the EC Treaty provide the gov-
erning bodies of the Community with the authority to adopt di-
rectives.43 Pursuant to Article 189,44 once a directive is passed by
the Council, each Member State must pass local legislation that
accomplishes the directive's goals.45 When the Council46 adopts
a directive, the Member States must enact legislation implement-
ing the directive into its national law, within a certain time
frame.47 Member States, however, select the form and methods
for attaining the goals set forth in the directive. 48 The directive
merely provides the framework for the Member States to imple-
ment legislation.49
(c) the interpretation of the statutes of bodies established by an act of the
Council, where those statutes so provide.
Where such a question is raised before any court or tribunal of a Member
State, that court or tribunal may, if it considers that a decision on the question
is necessary to enable it to give judgment, request the Court of'Justice to give a
ruling thereon.
Id
41. Id, art. 100. Article 100 states:
The Council shall, acting unanimously on a proposal from the Commis-
sion, issue directives for the approximation of such provisions laid down by
law, regulation or administrative action in Member States as directly affect the
establishment or functioning of the common market.
Id.; see id. art 100a (allowing Council to act by qualified majority on proposal from
Commission pursuant to co-decision process).
42. Id. art. 235. Article 235 states:
If any action by the Community appears necessary to achieve, in the func-
tioning of the Common Market, one of the aims of the Community in cases
where this Treaty has not provided for the requisite powers of action, the
Council, acting by means of a unanimous vote on a proposal of the Commis-




44. Id. art. 189. Article 189 defines the types of legislation that the governing bod-
ies of the Community may adopt, including the definition of directives. Id.
45. Id. Article 189 states that "[a] directive shall be binding, as to the result to be
achieved, upon each Member State to which it is addressed, but shall leave to the na-
tional authorities the choice of form and methods." Id. art. 189.
46. See supra note 13 (explaining role of Council).
47. EC Treaty, supra note 2, art. 189; see Toepke, supra note 7, at 651 (discussing
Council's ability to enact legislative measures, including directives).
48. Id.
49. EC Treaty, supra note 2, art. 189. Article 189 states that "[f]or the achievement
of their aims and under the condition provided for in this Treaty, the Council and
Commission shall adopt regulations and directives." Id.
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1. Vertical Direct Effect
The ability of individuals or enterprises to challenge a Mem-
ber State's national law implementing a directive as inadequate
or the Member State's failure to adopt national law implement-
ing a directive reflects another major doctrinal development of
the Court of Justice known as the direct effect of directives.50
Vertical direct effect allows provisions of Community law to be-
come legally binding in each of the Member States' national
legal systems, regardless of whether the Member State has for-
mally incorporated the EC legislation into its national law.5
Thus, if a provision of a directive is deemed to have vertical di-
rect effect, it is self-executing, and grants citizens of the Member
States certain rights.52 As a result, the direct effect doctrine gives
private parties the ability to enforce rights, granted under Com-
munity law, against Member States in their national court sys-
tems.53
50. Van Duyn v. Home Office, Case 41/74, [1974] E.C.R. 1337, [1974] 1 C.M.L.R.
347; see Becker v. Finanzamt Mfinster-Innenstadt, Case 8/81, [1982] E.C.R 53, [1982]
1 C.M.L.R. 499 (holding that regardless of whether Member State has implemented
directive, individual may rely on that directive in national court system if claim is against
Member State government and directive is clear, unconditional, and sufficiently pre-
cise).
51. See Van Duyn, [1974] E.C.R. at 1337, [1974] 1 C.M.L.RL at 347 (holding that
directives are directly applicable to Member States regardless of whether Member States
formally adopted legislation to implement directive or implemented directive improp-
erly); see also supra note 50 (discussing Court's holding in Bedwr v. Finanzamt Milnster-
Innenstadt); BERMAN Er AL., supra note 7, at 181 (describing doctrine of vertical direct
effect and impact in Community).
52. BERMANN Er AL, supra note 7, at 181 (noting that doctrine of vertical direct
effect gives individuals rights they would not have possessed if not for EC legislation).
53. Id. One commentator characterizes the doctrine of direct effect as the follow-
ing:
[A] Community law rule has direct effect if it creates rights for private parties,
and not merely obligations for the Member States. The practical consequence
is that private parties can then enforce these rights against the Member States
in their national courts, the latter guided as necessary by the Court of Justice
through preliminary rulings under Article 177. To say further that certain
Community law provisions have horizontal direct effect.., is to say that they
create rights and obligations as between private parties and not merely against
Member States. Once again the practical consequence is that national courts
are bound to provide a suitable remedy for the enforcement of such private
rights and obligations.
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a. The Origin of the Doctrine of Vertical Direct Effect
The Court of Justice, in its landmark decision Van Gend en
Loos, 4 set forth the principle of l'effet utile.55 In Van Gend en Loos,
the Court of Justice was asked to interpret an article of the EEC
Treaty and was forced to decide whether the Court ofJustice had
jurisdiction to determine that a provision of the EEC Treaty
should prevail over national legislation. 6 The Court of Justice
54. BE~miA ET A ., supra note 7, at 171 (stating that Van Gend en Loos remains one
of Court's most forceful statements of its view on legal nature of Community).
55. Van Gend en Loos, [1963] E.C.R. at 1, [1963] 2 C.M.L.R. at 105; BERmANN Er Aj.,
supra note 7, at 183. Lleffet utile means "the useful effect." Id. The Court elaborated on
the 1effet utile doctrine in Van Duyn v. Home Office, Case 41/74, [1974] E.C.R. 1337,
[1974] C.M.L.R. 347, characterizing the doctrine as follows:
In particular, where the Community authorities have, by directive, imposed on
Member States the obligation to pursue a particular course of conduct, the
useful effect [1'effet utile] of such an act would be weakened if individuals were
prevented from relying on it before their national courts and if the latter were
prevented from taking it into consideration as an element of Community law.
Id. at 1348, [1974] 13 C.M.L.R. at 351. Van Gend en Loos is often cited as an example of
the Court of Justice's judicial activist philosophy. See, e.g., Mauro Cappelletti, Is The
European Court ofJustice "Running Wild?, 12 Eua. L. Rav. 3 (1987) (noting that in Van
Gend en Loos, Court's activism created fundamental pillar of Court's subsequent case
law); Detlev Vagts & Martin Shapiro, On Law and Policy in the European Court ofJustice: A
Comparative Study in judicial Policy Making, 81 AM.J. INT'L L. 1007, 1009 (observing that
in Van Gend en Loos, Court was "extremely judicially active in creating legal embodi-
ments on the values of European integration, essentially filling in the gap left by the
failure of other Community institutions [t]o move toward a greater integration"). Judi-
cial activism is defined as a
philosophy which motivates judges to depart from strict adherence to judicial
precedent in favor [of] progressive and new social policies which are not al-
ways consistent with the restraint expected of appellatejudges. It is commonly
marked by decisions calling for social engineering and occasionally these deci-
sions represent intrusions into legislative and executive matters.
BLACK'S LAw DICrIoNARY 760 (6th ed. 1990). As stated by one scholar, the thrust of the
discussion concerning judicial activism
[d]eals with the protection/destruction issue in relation to the European
Court's original and accumulated authority and legitimacy... At stake in any
powerful promotion of political integration by judicial decision is always the
Court's unfettered ability to continue to promote precisely political integra-
tion. This is inevitably so because the European Court has to invent legal con-
struction to the political problems under adjudication with which enforce-
ment agencies on Community and national level will comply- and because
non-compliance and defiance is likely to flow from a perception of the Euro-
pean Court as a usurper of political power.
Hjalte Rasmussen, Between Sef-Restraint and Activism: A Judicial Policy for the European
Court, 13 EuP. L. REv. 28 (1988); see Eugene C. Austin, The European Court ofJustice." Last
Hope for 1992, 1990 B.Y.U. L. Ray. 1631, 1639 (arguing that "activism enables the Court
to fill in the blanks and to apply the law in such a way thatjustice is satisfied").
56. Van Gend En Loos, [1963] E.C.R. at 1, [1963] 2 C.M.L.R. at 105.
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held that the establishment of the EEC Treaty created a new
legal order.57 According to this new legal order, the Member
States abdicated some of their sovereign rights by joining the
Community and thus, community legislation must supersede na-
tional legislation.5 For Community law to have vertical direct
effect, however, its provisions must be clear and unconditional,
and the individual's claim must be brought against the Member
State. Otherwise, the Court of'Justice will not permit the individ-
ual to proceed with the claim in the individual's Member State's
national court system.59 In Van Duyn v. Home Office, the Court of
Justice expanded the doctrine of vertical direct effect to apply to
directives. 0
In Van Duyn, the Court of Justice was asked to decide
whether an individual could rely on a directive that the Member
State had not yet implemented.6 1 The question arose because
directives are not self-executing and the Member States are al-
57. Id. at 12, [1963] 2 C.M.L.R. at 139. In part, the decision states:
In addition the task assigned to the Court of Justice under Article 177, the
object of which is to secure uniform interpretation of the Treaty by the na-
tional courts and tribunals, confirms that the states have acknowledged that
Community law has an authority which can be invoked by their nationals
before those courts and tribunals.
The conclusion to be drawn from this is that the Community constitutes a
new legal order of international law for the benefit of which the states have
limited their sovereign rights, albeit within limited fields, and the subjects of
which comprise not only Member States but also their nationals. Indepen-
dentiy of the legislation of Member States, Community law therefore not only
imposes obligations on individuals but is also intended to confer upon them
rights which become part of their legal heritage. These rights arise not only
where they are expressly granted by the Treaty, but also by reason of obliga-
tions which the Treaty imposes in a clearly defined way upon individuals as
well as upon the Member States and upon the institutions of the Community.
Id.
58. Id.
59. Id. The Court ofJustice said that Article 12 had direct effect - i.e., that an
individual had the right to rely on that provision of the directive, because Article 12
contains a clear and unconditional prohibition which is not a positive but a
negative obligation. This obligation, moreover, is not qualified by any reserva-
tion on the part of states which would make its implementation conditional
upon a positive legislative measure enacted under national law. The very na-
ture of this prohibition makes it ideally adapted to produce direct effects in
the legal relationship between Member States and their subjects.
Id. at 13, [1963] 2 C.M.L.R. at 130.
60. Case 41/74, [1974] E.C.R. 1337, [1974] 1, C.M.L.R 347.
61. Id
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lowed to choose the method for their implementation.62 The
Court in Van Duyn held that a directive may have direct effect
when that directive meets the test set forth in Van Gend en Loos.
6 3
Accordingly, a directive may have vertical direct effect when the
provision of the directive on which the individual seeks to rely is
sufficiently precise and the claim is against the individual's Mem-
ber State government, and not against another private individ-
ual.64
b. Action Must Be Against the Member State's Government
Vertical direct effect permits individuals to enforce the
rights granted them by a directive 65 against a state or a state ac-
62. Id. The Court of Justice held that:
Article 189 of the Treaty distinguishes in fact between regulations, which are
not only binding but also directly applicable in the Member States, and direc-
tives, which are also binding on the States but which have, in principle, no
direct effect inasmuch as they leave to the States the choice of methods for
their implementation.
Nevertheless, looking beyond formal legal categories, the Court declared
... that, apart from regulations, other Community acts mentioned in Article
189 may have direct effect, particularly in cases where the Community authori-
ties have imposed on Member States the obligation to adopt a particular
course of conduct. The Court stated that the positive effect of these acts
would be lessened if individuals were unable, in such a case, to enforce
through the courts rights conferred on them by decisions of this nature, even
though such decisions were not taken in the form of regulations.
Id. at 1355, [1974] 1 C.M.L.R- at 357.
63. Id. The Court of Justice stated that:
[A] directive, the purpose of which is to set a final date for the implementa-
tion by a Member State of a Community obligation, concerns not only the
relations between the Commission and that State, but also entails legal conse-
quences on which individuals may in particular rely whenever, by its very na-
ture, the provision enacting that obligation is directly applicable.
When faced with a directive, it is therefore necessary to examine, in each
case, whether the wording, nature and general scheme of the provisions in
question are capable of producing direct effects between Member States to
which the directive is addressed and their subjects.
Id. The period for implementation, however, must have expired before an individual is
able to claim that the Member State violated the directive. Pubblico Ministero v. Ratti,
Case 148/78, [1979] E.C.R. 1629, [1980] 1 C.M.L.R. 96. It is only at the end of the
prescribed period that the directive is capable of having direct effect. Id. at 1637,
[1980] C.M.L.R at 108.
64. Van Gend en Loos v. Nederlandse Administrate der Belastingen, Case 26/62,
[1963] E.C.R1 1, [1963] 2 C.M.L.R. 105; Van Duyn, [1974] E.C.R. at 1352, [1974] 3
C.M.L.R. at 356.
65. See Van Duyn, [1974] E.C.R. at 1337, [1974] 1 C.M.L.R. at 347 (granting indi-
viduals right to challenge Member States' failure to implement directive). The Court's
holding in Van Duyn was a logical progression of the Court's holding in Van Gend en
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tor.6 6 If the Member State has not created legislation to imple-
ment the directive within the prescribed period, or the Member
State has not yet fully implemented the directive, under certain
circumstances, individuals may seek to rely on the directive
against their Member State's government.67 For an individual to
Loos. Cappelletti, supra note 55, at 3. In Van Gend en Loos, the Court ofJustice set forth
the principle of l'effet utile. Van Gend en Loos, [1963] E.C.R. at 13, [1963] 2 C.M.LR. at
109. Van Gend en Loos was a landmark decision in the legal nature of the Community.
BE~mANuN r A., supra note 7, at 171. In Van Gend en Loos, the Court of Justice was
asked to interpret an article of the EC Treaty within the context of EC law and whether
the Court ofJustice had jurisdiction to determine that EC law should prevail over na-
tional legislation. Van Gend en Loos, [1963] E.C.1L, at 11, [1963] 2 C.M.L.RI at 114.
Specifically, the Court of Justice stated:
The objective of the EEC Treaty, which is to establish a Common Market,
the functioning of which is of direct concern to interested parties in the Com-
munity, implies that this Treaty is more than an agreement which merely cre-
ates mutual obligations between the contracting states. This view is confirmed
by the preamble to the Treaty which refers not only to governments but to
peoples. It is also confirmed more specifically by the establishment of institu-
tions endowed with sovereign rights, the exercise of which affects Member
States and also their citizens. Furthermore, it must be noted that the nationals
of the states brought together in the Community are called upon to cooperate
in the functioning of this Community through the intermediary of the Euro-
pean Parliament and the Economic and Social Committee.
In addition to the task assigned to the Court ofJustice under Article 177,
the object of which is to secure uniform interpretation of the Treaty by na-
tional courts and tribunals, confirms that the states have acknowledged that
Community law has an authority which can be invoked by their nationals
before those courts and tribunals.
The conclusion to be drawn from this is that the Community constitutes a
new legal order of international law for the benefit of which the states have
limited their sovereign rights, albeit within limited fields, and the subjects of
which comprise not only Member States but also their nationals. Indepen-
dently of the legislation of the Member States, Community law therefore not
only imposes obligations on individuals but is also intended to confer upon
them rights which become part of their legal heritage. These rights arise not
only where they are expressly granted by the Treaty, but also by reason of
obligations which the Treaty imposes in a clearly defined way upon individuals
as well as upon the Member States and upon institutions of the Community.
Id. at 12, [1963] 2 C.M.L.RI at 129.
66. See Marshall I, Case 152/84, [1986] E.C.R. 723, 726, [1986] 1 C.M.L.R 688,
689 (stating that individuals can bring claims if institution that has violated directive is
organ of state).
67. See Derrick Wyatt, The Direct Effect of Community Social Law-Not Forgetting Direc-
tives, 8 EuR. L. RPv. 241, 245 (1983) (describing Court's reasoning for giving directives
vertical direct effect); see also Van Duyn v. Home Office, Case 41/74, [1974] E.C.R.
1337, [1974] 1 C.M.L.R 347 (concerning binding nature of directives). In Van Duyn,
the national court was confused over whether an individual could rely on a directive
that the Member State had not yet adopted. Id. This confusion was due to the fact that
directives are not self-implementing and that Member States are given the choice of
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rely on a directive, however, the individual's complaint must be
against the Member State."8
The requirement that the individual's claim must be against
the Member State is premised on the Court of Justice's holding
in Van Duyn as well as Becker v. Finanzamt Muenster-Innenstadt.69
In Becker v. Finanzamt Muenster-Innestadt,° the Court of Justice
held that when an individual is claiming that the Member State
has violated an EC directive, that individual has the right to rely
on the directive in the Member State's national court system.71
The Court ofJustice, in Becker, stated that directives are enforce-
able against a Member State government because it would be
incongruous not to allow individuals to consider a directive na-
tional law.72 According to the Court of Justice, any other deci-
methods for implementing directives. Id. In Van Duyn, the Court of Justice resolved
this confusion with the following answer.
[A] directive, the purpose of which is to set a final date for the implementa-
tion by a Member State of a Community obligation, concerns not only the
relations between the Commission and that State, but also entails legal conse-
quences on which individuals may in particular rely whenever, by its very na-
ture, the provision... is directly applicable.
When faced with a directive, it is therefore necessary to examine, in each
case, whether the wording, nature and general scheme of the provisions in
question are capable of producing direct effects between the Member States to
which the directive is addressed and their subjects.
Id. at 1355, [1974] 1 C.M.L.RI at 349.
68. See Becker v. Finanzamt Mfinster-Innenstadt, Case 8/81, [1982] E.C.R. 53,
[1982] 1 C.M.L.R. 499.
69. Id.
70. Id. In Becker, the Federal Republic of Germany failed to implement Directive
77/388/EEC within the prescribed period. Id. at 59, [1982] 1 C.M.L.R. at 504. Becker
initiated this claim and argued that he was entitled to rely on the Directive even though
the Federal Republic of Germany had not yet implemented the Directive. Id. at 56,
[1982] 1 C.M.L.R. at 501. The Federal Republic of Germany maintained that Becker's
claim should be adjudicated under national law until the Directive's implementation.
Id. at 59, [1982] 1 C.M.L.R. at 504.
71. Id.
72. Id. Precisely, the Court of Justice stated:
It would be incompatible with the binding effect which Article 189 as-
cribes to directives to exclude in principle the possibility of the obligations
imposed by them being relied on by persons concerned. Particularly in cases
in which the community authorities have, by means of a directive, placed
member states under a duty to adopt a certain course of action, the effective-
ness of such a measure would be diminished if persons were prevented from
... taking it into consideration as an element of community law.
Id. at 70, [1982] 1 C.M.L.R. at 512; see Van Duyn, [1974] E.C.R1 at 1337, [1974] 1
C.M.L.R. at 347 (discussing direct effect of directives, also referred to as 1'effe utile doc-
trine). Van Duyn was the precursor to Becker and employed the same reasoning in hold-
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sion would diminish the directive's effectiveness and would de-
prive the Member State of any incentive for implementing direc-
tives of which they disapproved. 3
A private actor, however, does not have a duty to conform to
a directive that the Member State has not yet incorporated into
its national law, and therefore, a private individual may not sue
another private individual for the violation of this directive.74
Article 189 does not give the Council the authority to enact a
directive that is binding on one individual as against another in-
dividual. 5 Once the Member State adopts the directive into its
national law, however, an individual may bring a claim against
another individual, in the national court system, for failure to
adhere to the adopted legislation. Thus, the individual relies
on the Member State's national law that was enacted to imple-
ing the Member State liable for the failure to fully implement the directive. BERMANN
Er AL, supra note 7, at 183.
73. Becker, [1982] E.C.R. at 53, [1982] 1 C.M.L.R. at 499. The Court ofJustice, in
Becker, articulated this by stating that
[w]herever the provisions of a directive appear, as far as their subject matter is
concerned, to be unconditional and sufficiently precise, those provisions may
in the absence of implementing measures adopted within the prescribed pe-
riod, be relied upon as against any national provision which is incompatible
with the directive or in so far as the provisions define rights which individuals
are able to assert against the State.
Id. at 71, [1982] 1 C.M.L.R. at 512; see Marshall I, Case 152/84, [1986] E.C.R. 723,
[1986] 1 C.M.L.RL 688. In Marshall I, the Court of Justice held that
[w] here a person involved in legal proceedings is able to rely on a directive as
against the State he may do so regardless of the capacity in which the latter is
acting, whether employer or public authority. In either case it is necessary to
prevent the State from taking advantage of its own failure to comply with Com-
munity law.
Id. at 725, [1986] 1 C.M.L.R. at 702.
74. See EC Treaty, supra note 2, art. 189.
75. See id. (setting forth the types of legislation that Council may use); see also Mar-
shall , [1986] E.C.R. at 723, [1986] 1 C.M.LR. at 688. In Marshall I, the Court of
Justice held that:
With regard to the argument that a directive may not be relied upon against
an individual, it must be emphasized that according to Article 189 of the EEC
Treaty the binding nature of a directive, which constitutes the basis for the
possibility of relying on the directive before a national court, exists only in
relation to 'each Member State to which it is addressed'. It follows that a di-
rective may not itself impose obligations on an individual and that a provision
of a directive may not be relied upon as such against such a person. It must
therefore be examined whether, in this case, the respondent must be regarded
as having acted as an individual.
Id. at 727, [1986] C.M.L.R. at 702.
76. See Marshall I, [1986] E.C.R. at 749, [1986] 1 C.M.L.R. at 711 (holding that
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ment the EC directive."
c. Provisions of a Directive Must Be Sufficiently Precise
For an individual to rely on a directive in an action against a
Member State, the Court ofJustice must also determine that the
directive is "clear, unconditional and non-discretionary."78  The
Court of Justice decides this on a case-by-case analysis.79 If the
Court ofJustice determines that the directive is sufficiently clear,
the Member State is presumed to have been fully aware of the
directive's requirements.8 0 Where the Court finds that a direc-
tive is precise, the Member State will not be excused by the
Court for the Member State's failure to fully or adequately im-
plement the directive."
If the Court ofJustice holds that one provision of a directive
is sufficiently clear, but other provisions in the same directive
suffer from ambiguity, the entire directive cannot meet the test
for vertical direct effect.8 2 Nonetheless, if the Court of Justice
finds that a specific provision in the directive on which the indi-
vidual seeks to rely is sufficiently precise, the individual can still
bring a claim, relying on that specific provision of the directive.
8 3
Thus, the Court has frequently found that only one article of a
"directive may not of itself impose obligations on an individual and that a provision of a
directive may not be relied upon as such against such a person").
77. 1&
78. See Van Duyn v. Home Office, Case 41/74, [1974] E.C.R 1337, [1974] 1
C.M.L.R. 347. The Court ofJustice stated that "[t]hese provisions impose on Member
States a precise obligation which does not require the adoption of any further measure
on the part either of the Community institutions or of the Member States and which
leaves them, in relation to its implementation, no discretionary power." Id, at 1347,
[1974] 1 C.M.L.R. at 352.
79. Id.
80. See, e.g., Marshall I, [1986] E.C.R. at 723, [1986] 1 C.M.L.R. at 688 (holding
that Article 5(1) of Equal Treatment Directive was sufficiently precise and therefore
United Kingdom could not claim that it was unaware that its national legislation regard-
ing dismissal policies violated Equal Treatment Directive).
81. See id. (arguing that Member State was not fully aware of directives require-
ments will not be accepted by Court); see also Becker v. Finanzamt Mfinster-Innestadt,
Case 8/81, [1982] E.C.1. 53, [1982] 1 C.M.L.R. 499 (holding that Germany's failure to
implement directive correctly made it liable, regardless of whether Germany, at the
time of implementation, believed it had done so properly).
82. See Von Colson and Kamann v. Land Nordrhein-Westfilen, Case 14/83, [1984]
E.C.RL 1891, [1986] 2 C.M.L.R. 430 (holding that German law applied concerning dam-
ages for violations of Equal Treatment Directive).
83. See, e.g., Marshall I, [1986] E.C.L 723, [1986] 1 C.M.L.R. 688; Foster v. British
Gas, Plc., Case 188/89, [1990] 7 E.C.R. 3313, [1990] 2 C.M.L.R. 833 (allowing female
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directive has vertical direct effect, but the entire directive does
not.
8 4
B. The Equal Treatment Directive
Article 119 of the EC Treaty requires equal pay for equal
work for the sexes.85 The Court ofJustice, however, has not con-
strued Article 119 so broadly as to require equal treatment be-
tween men and women in general working conditions.8 6 The
governing bodies of the Community, therefore, felt it was neces-
sary to take legislative action to achieve this goal."
The Equal Treatment Directive (or "Directive") ensures that
male and female employees are treated equally in the Member
States' workforces.88 By adopting the Equal Treatment Direc-
tive, the Community attempted to create equal working condi-
tions.8" The Court's jurisprudence has also been required to
properly apply the principles of the Directive. Notwithstanding
proper implementation by the Member States, the Equal Treat-
ment Directive lacks a specific provision regarding the damages
an individual is entitled to receive in the event that his Member
State has violated an Equal Treatment Directive provision having
vertical direct effect.90
employee to bring claim against statutorily created monopoly, which Court of Justice
deemed emanation of State, allowing employee to rely on Equal Treatment Directive).
84. See, e.g., Marshall I, [1986] E.C.R. at 723, [1986] 1 C.M.L.R1 at 688. In Marshall
, the Court ofJustice interpreted Articles 1, 2, and 5 of the Equal Treatment Directive
and determined that, although Article 2 did not have vertical direct effect, this did not
mean that Article 5 could not be given direct effect. I. at 751, [1986] 1 C.M.L.R1 at
713.
85. EC Treaty, supra note 2, art. 119; see supra notes 14-19 and accompanying text
(discussing Social Action Program adopted by Council); see also Council Resolution of
21 January 1974, supra note 8, O.J. C 13/1 (1974) (discussing rationale for Social Ac-
tion Program).
86. See Defrenne v. Soci6t6 Anonyme Belge de Navigation A6rienne Sabena, Case
149/77, [1978] E.C.R. 1365, [1978] 3 C.M.L.R. 312 [hereinafter Defrenne III]. In
Defrenne III, Ms. Defrenne challenged her employer's involuntary retirement policy,
which required female flight attendants to retire at the age of 40 while men could
continue working past the age of 40. Id. at 1366, [1978] 3 C.M.L.RI at 314. The Court
of Justice held that Article 119 did not prohibit discriminatory working conditions. Id.
87. See supra note 10 and accompanying text (discussing need for common social
program).
88. See Equal Treatment Directive, supra note 22, art. 1(1), O.J. L 39/40, at 41
(1976).
89. Equal Treatment Directive, supra note 22, art. 5 (1), O.J. L 39/40, at 41 (1976).
90. See Von Colson and Kamann v. Land Nordrhein-Westfalen, Case 14/83, [1984]
E.C.R. 1891, [1986] 2 C.M.LR 430.
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1. The Equal Treatment Directive Generally
Because the Council had some doubts that equal treatment
in working conditions could be considered as an appropriate
scope for harmonization under Article 100, the Equal Treatment
Directive is one of the rare directives adopted by the Council
using the implied powers of Article 235. 91 Passed to eradicate
sexual discrimination in the workplace, 92 the Equal Treatment
Directive attempts to achieve equal access to employment, pro-
motion, vocational training, working conditions, and some as-
pects of social security, as well as equal application of dismissal
policies.9 3 The Directive prohibits both direct and indirect dis-
crimination 94 due to marital or family status. 5 In addition, the
Equal Treatment Directive allows Member States to adopt meas-
ures to obtain gender equality beyond those articulated in the
directive. 6
2. Article 5(1) and Article 6 of the Equal Treatment Directive
Article 5(1) of the Equal Treatment Directive is the most
91. EC Treaty, supra note 2, art. 235. The Council or Commission can act in the
social field under Article 235, where no other provision of the Treaty authorizes the
Community institutions to take adequate action. Goebel, supra note 6, at 37. When
directives are adopted pursuant to Article 235, the directives are still treated the same as
if the directive had been adopted pursuant to Article 189. Id. Goebel characterizes the
use of Article 235 as follows:
From a constitutional point of view, this use of article 235 is quite important
because it represents the first time that social action legislation was deemed to
be appropriate as a concern of the Community even though some form of
economic or other justification related to the attainment of the common mar-
ket appeared to be lacking.
Id.
92. Equal Treatment Directive, supra note 22, art. 1(1), OJ. L 39/40, at 40 (1976).
The purpose of this Directive is to put into effect in the Member States the
principle of equal treatment for men and women as regards access to employ-
ment, including promotion, and to vocational training as regards working con-
ditions and... social security. This principle is hereinafter referred to as "the
principle of equal treatment."
Id.
93. Id. art. 5(1), O.J. L 39/40, at 41 (1976).
94. Id. art. 2, O.J. L 39/40, at 41 (1976). Article 2(1) prohibits any legislation,
whether discriminatory or neutral on its face, that adversely affects a disparate number
of women rather than men because of their marital status. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id. art. 2(4), OJ. L 39/41, at 41 (1976) (stating that "this Directive shall be
without prejudice to measures to promote equal opportunity for men and women, in
particular by removing existing inequalities which affect women's opportunities").
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widely used article relied on by individuals who claim they have
been the victim of gender discrimination.97 This is due to the
fact that substantively, Article 5 contains express prohibitions
concerning how employees must be treated in the workplace.98
Prior to Marshall II, however, Article 6 had not been widely re-
lied on because it had been thought to be only a general provi-
sion requiring Member States to create a judicial process
whereby individuals who felt aggrieved by gender discrimination
could pursue their claim judiciously.99
Article 5(1) of the Equal Treatment Directive has vertical
direct effect,' and therefore, is only enforceable by an individ-
ual against that individual's Member State's government. 1 1
97. See, e.g., Von Colson and Kamann v. Land Nordrhein-Westfalen, Case 14/83,
[1984] E.C.R. 1891, [1986] 2 C.M.LR. 430; Foster v. British Gas Plc., Case 188/89,
[1990] 7 E.C.R. 3313, [1990] 2 C.M.L.R. 833; Marshall I, Case 152/84, [1986] E.C.R.
723, [1986] 1 C.M.L.R. 688 (all relying on Article 5(1) of Equal Treatment Directive).
98. Equal Treatment Directive, supra note 22, O.J. L 39/40, at 41 (1976). Article 5
states:
1. Application of the principle of equal treatment with regard to working con-
ditions, including the conditions governing dismissal means that men and wo-
men shall be guaranteed the same conditions without discrimination on the
grounds of sex.
2. To this end, Member States shall take the measures necessary to ensure that
(a) any laws, regulations and administrative provisions contrary to the
principle of equal treatment shall be abolished;
(b) any provision contrary to the principle of equal treatment which are
included in collective agreements, individual contracts of employment, inter-
nal rules of undertakings or in rules governing the independent occupations
and professions shall be, or may be declared, null and void or may be
amended;
(c) those laws, regulations and administrative provisions contrary to the
principle of equal treatment when the concern for protection which originally
inspired them is no longer well founded shall be revised; and that where simi-
lar provisions are included in collective agreements labour and management
shall be requested to undertake the desired revisions.
Id
99. Equal Treatment Directive, supra note 22, OJ. L 39/40, at 41 (1976). Article 6
states:
Member States shall introduce into their national legal systems such measures
as are necessary to enable all persons who consider themselves wronged by
failure to apply to them the principle of equal treatment within the meaning
of Articles 3, 4 and 5 to pursue their claims by judicial process after possible
recourse to other competent authorities.
Id.
100. See supra notes 60-64 and accompanying text (discussing definition of vertical
direct effect).
101. See supra notes 60-64 and accompanying text (discussing definition of vertical
direct effect).
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Prior to Marshall 11, however, the Court of Justice held that the
Equal Treatment Directive did not contain a sufficiently precise
provision concerning the availability of damages for a Member
102State's violation of the Equal Treatment Directive. This pre
cluded individuals from claiming that they were entitled to a spe-
cific remedy for a Member State's violation of the Equal Treat-
ment Directive.10
3
C. Marshall I: Defining State Entity
An individual can rely on the Equal Treatment Directive in
a suit commenced against the Member State. °' Prior to 1986, a
distinction was made between the state acting in a government
capacity, and the state acting as an employer. 05 In 1986, how-
ever, the Court abandoned this distinction.' 06
In Marshall v. Southampton Health Authorities (Marshall 1), the
United Kingdom's national court submitted a request for a pre-
liminary ruling'07 to the Court of Justice. 08  The United King-
102. Von Colson and Kamann v. Land Nordrhein-Westfalen, Case 14/83, [1984]
E.C.R. 1891, [1986] 2 C.M.L.R. 430.
103. See supra notes 78-84 and accompanying text (noting that if provision is not
precise, party cannot bring claim).
104. See supra notes 81-82 (citing holdings of cases where Court has found that
Equal Treatment Directive has vertical direct effect); see also supra note 26 and accom-
panying text (discussing direct effect of Equal Treatment Directive).
105. Marshall I, Case 152/84, [1986] E.C.R. 723, 731, [1986] 1 C.M.L.R 688, 711.
106. Id.
107. Id. If a directive is not adopted within its allotted time, or is improperly im-
plemented, the usual recourse is a Commission proceeding, under Article 169, to com-
pel the Member State to implement the appropriate legislation to conform to the objec-
tives of the directive. EC Treaty, supra note 2, art. 169. In addition, a directive can be
the subject of interpretation to ensure its proper implementation through the prelimi-
nary ruling procedure of Article 177. Id. art. 177.
A Member State's court or tribunal may request a preliminary ruling from the
Court of Justice when an individual claims to have suffered from a violation of a provi-
sion of an EC directive and has initiated a claim in the individual's national court sys-
tem. Id The Member State's tribunal may request a preliminary ruling when an indi-
vidual seeks to rely on a directive and the Member State is uncertain whether the indi-
vidual has the right to rely on that directive. I& This uncertainty can arise in one of
two ways. Id.
First, the national court will submit a case for a preliminary ruling where the na-
tional tribunal suspects that the Member State's national law conflicts with a directive.
Von Colson v. Land Nordrhein-Westfflen, Case 14/83, [1984] E.C.R. 1891, [1986] 2
C.M.L.R 430. This occurs when a Member State adopts a directive, but because of the
discretion afforded to the Member States as to the means and methods of implement-
ing that directive, the Member State's national law arguably violates a provision of the
directive. Id. In this case, the Member State's national court will ask the Court ofJus-
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dom asked the Court ofJustice to determine whether the Mem-
ber State, acting in its capacity as an employer, can be held liable
for its violations of the Equal Treatment Directive. 109 The Court
of Justice held that a Member State, acting in its capacity as an
employer, is in violation of the Equal Treatment Directive when
the Member State's employees are treated in a discriminatory
manner.110
In Marshall , a sixty-two year old woman was forced to retire
from the United Kingdom's Health Authority,"' while her male
co-workers were allowed to continue working until the age of
sixty-five. 12 Ms. Marshall brought suit, alleging that her forced
retirement contradicted the Equal Treatment Directive."1 The
Court ofJustice held that the right of an individual to rely on the
Equal Treatment Directive encompassed situations in which the
tice to issue a preliminary ruling to determine whether the citizen has the right to rely
on the directive, and if the citizen does have that right, if the Member State's national
law is in derogation of the directive. EC Treaty, supra note 2, art. 189. If the Court of
Justice determines that the Member State's national law conflicts with the directive, the
Court of Justice will instruct the national court to resolve the citizen's claim. Id. art.
164. The Court ofJustice's guidance is binding on the Member State. Id.
A Member State may also request a preliminary ruling from the Court of Justice
where the Member State has not adopted a directive at all, and a citizen claims that the
directive is binding on the Member State. Marshall I, [1986] E.C.R. at 725, [1986] 1
C.M.L.R at 700. In this situation, the Court ofJustice will determine if the individual's
complaint is within the purview of the directive. BERMANN ET Ai-, supra note 7, at 57. If
the Court of Justice determines that the individual's complaint is within the scope of
the directive, the Court ofJustice instructs the national court to resolve the individual's
claim in accordance with the directive. Id.
108. Case 152/84, [1986] E.C.R. 723, [1986] 1 C.M.L.R. 688.
109. Id. at 735, [1986] 1 C.M.L.R. at 701.
110. Id.
111. Employment Appeal Tribunal Rules 1980, § 3 (Eng.) (amending Employ-
ment Protection (Consolidation) Act 1978 sch. 11(7) (Eng.)). The Health Authority
was created by the National Health Authority Act of 1977. Id. The Health Authority
was delegated the responsibility of providing health care for all United Kingdom citi-
zens. Id.
112. Id. at 726, [1986] 1 C.M.L.R. at 691.
113. Equal Treatment Directive, supra note 22, art. 5(1), OJ. L 39/40, at 41
(1976). Article 5(1) is the provision of the Equal Treatment Directive that Ms. Marshall
claimed the Health Authority violated when they forced her to retire at the age of 62,
three years before a male would be forced to retire. Marshall I, [1986] E.C.R. at 735,
[1986] 1 C.M.L.R. at 701. Article 5(1) of the Equal Treatment Directive states that
"[a]pplication of the principle of equal treatment with regard to working conditions,
including the conditions governing dismissal, means that men and women shall be
guaranteed the same conditions without discrimination on the grounds of sex." Equal
Treatment Directive, supra note 22, art 5(1), O.J. L 39/40, at 41 (1976).
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state acted in its capacity as an employer.1 1 4 Thus, Marshall I
exl'anded the number of state actors that could be held liable
for violations of the Equal Treatment Directive." 5
The Court of Justice determined that Ms. Marshall could
rely on the Equal Treatment Directive because Article 5(1) of
the Equal Treatment Directive, which prohibits discriminatory
practices regarding dismissals, including retirement policies, was
sufficiently precise."' In addition, the Court ofJustice held that
the Health Authority was an entity of the United Kingdom's gov-
ernment.17 Therefore, the Health Authority was a crown body,
and their employees were crown servants." 8
In Marshall I, the United Kingdom argued that if the Court
of Justice expanded the Equal Treatment Directive to include
the state acting in its capacity as an employer, the state would be
held to a higher standard than private employers." 9 According
to the United Kingdom, the Court of Justice would be creating
an arbitrary and unfair distinction between the rights of state
employees and those of private employees.120 The Court of Jus-
tice, however, rejected this argument, holding that if an individ-
ual is allowed to rely on a directive against the state, it is irrele-
vant in which capacity the state is acting, whether as an employer
or as a public authority.
12 1
The Court of Justice expressly rejected the United King-
114. MarshallI, [1986] E.C.R. at 751, [1986] 1 C.M.L.R. at 713.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 750, [1986] 1 C.M.L.R. at 711-12. The Court ofJustice stated that:
Article 5(1) of [the Equal Treatment Directive,] which prohibits any dis-
crimination on grounds of sex with regard to working conditions, including
the conditions governing dismissal, may be relied upon as against a state au-
thority acting in its capacity as employer, in order to avoid the application of
any national provision which does not conform to Article 5(1).
Id. at 748, [1986] 1 C.M.L.R. at 710.
117. Id. at 749, [1986] 1 C.M.L.R. at 711. The Health Authority had been created
by the National Health Authority Act of 1977 (Eng.). I.
118. Id. at 748, [1986] 1 C.M.L.R. at 710.
119. Id. at 747-48, [1986] 1 C.M.LR. at 710.
120. Id. at 749, [1986] 1 C.M.L.R. at 711.
121. I. In particular, the Court ofJustice stated that
where a person involved in legal proceedings is able to rely on a directive as
against the state he may do so regardless of the capacity in which the latter is
acting, whether as employer or public authority. In either case it is necessary
to prevent the state from taking advantage of its own failure to comply with
Community law.
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dom's argument that government employers should not be held
to a higher standard than private employers.122 As the Court of
Justice explained, any inequities that could arise if a state em-
ployer were held to a higher standard than a private employer
would be rectified once the Member State implemented the
Equal Treatment Directive.' 23 The Court ofJustice noted that if
the state was concerned with the disparate policies that may arise
between a private employer and a public employer, the state
could rectify the disparity by incorporating the directive into na-
tional law. 24 Once incorporated into national law, private em-
ployers would also be held liable for violations of the Equal
Treatment Directive. 125 Thus, after Marshall I, an individual has
the right to rely on the Equal Treatment Directive against his
Member State or any organ of the state that is acting in as an
employer.' 26
D. Remedies Available for Member States' Violations of the Equal
Treatment Directive Prior to Marshall II
Regardless of whether a Member State implements the
Equal Treatment Directive, an individual may rely on the Equal
Treatment Directive if the individual's claim is against the Mem-
ber State and the provision of the Equal Treatment Directive on
which the individual relies is sufficiently precise. 127 Prior to Mar-
shall II, individuals were not guaranteed that the damages they
sought would be granted,"' even if they proved that the Mem-





126. Id. at 751, [1986] 1 C.M.L.R. at 713. The Court ofJustice's holding, that the
state, acting in its capacity as employer, could be held liable for the failure to fully
implement the Equal Treatment Directive, was expanded further in Foster v. British Gas
Plc., Case 188/89, [1990] 7 E.C.R. 3313, [1990] 2 C.M.L.R. 833. In Foster, the Court of
Justice held that a statutorily created monopoly, in this case a gas company, was an
organ of the state. Id at 3348-49, [1990] 2 C.M.L.R at 857. The Court ofJustice rea-
soned that the Equal Treatment Directive envisaged a broad definition of a state entity.
Id.
127. See supra note 78 and accompanying text (noting that for individual to receivejudicial relief, provision of directive must be "clear, unconditional, and non-discretion-
ary").
128. See Von Colson v. Land Nordrhein-Westfalen, Case 14/83, [1984] E.C.R.
1891, 1908-09, [1986] 2 C.M.L.R. 430, 452-53 (holding that damages must have deter-
rent effect but do not have to be equal to damage actually sustained).
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tive.129 This was due to the Court of Justice's holding that the
Directive did not include a provision that sufficiently addressed
damages for violations of the Equal Treatment Directive.130
In Von Colson and Kamann v. Land Nordrhein-Westfalen,13 1 the
Court of Justice addressed the remedies available to individuals
for a Member State's violation of a provision of the Equal Treat-
ment Directive.1 2 In Von Colson, two female social workers al-
leged that a German state employer violated a sufficiently pre-
cise provision of the Equal Treatment Directive.'3 3 The plain-
tiffs, at the trial level, successfully established that the defendant,
an administrator of the Federal Republic of Germany's prison
system, did not hire them because they were female.13 4 The two
women proved that the prison administrator's behavior was dis-
criminatory, and therefore had violated Article 5 (1) of the Equal
Treatment Directive.3 5 The plaintiffs demanded that the de-
fendants either offer an employment contract or pay six months
salary.' 36 The German trial court, however, denied both reme-
dies 13 because under German law, the only damages that could
be granted were the costs associated with the plaintiffs' applica-
tion for the prison position.1
3 8
On the appellate level, the Federal Republic of Germany,
uncertain that its national law conformed with the Equal Treat-
ment Directive regarding remedies, asked the Court ofJustice to
issue a preliminary ruling on this issue. 3 9 The Court of Justice
determined that the Equal Treatment Directive did not include
sufficiently precise remedies for the victims of a discriminatory
practice. 140 The Court held that while more than purely nomi-
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Case 14/83, [1984] E.C.R. 1891, [1986] 2 C.M.L.RI 430.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 1893, [1986) 2 C.M.L.R. at 432-33.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 1902, [1986] 2 C.M.L.R. at 448.
136. Id. at 1893, [1986] 2 C.M.L.RI at 432-33.
137. Id. at 1894, [1986] 2 C.M.L.R. at 433.
138. Id. at 1892, [1986] 2 C.M.L.t. 431.
139. Id. at 1894, [1986] 2 C.M.L.R. at 433; see supra note 105 (discussing circum-
stances under which preliminary ruling is issued).
140. Von Colson, [1984] E.C.R. at 1910, [1986] 2 C.M.L.R. at 454. The Court of
Justice held:
[A]s regards sanctions for any discrimination which may occur, the directive
does not include any unconditional and sufficiently precise obligation which,
1994]
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nal damages must be awarded, it is for the national court to de-
cide what remedies, adequate in relation to the damages sus-
tained, individuals may receive for a Member State's violation of
the Equal Treatment Directive.' In sum, the Von Colson deci-
sion delegated the responsibility of determining what damages
an individual should receive to the Member State. 42
II. MARSHALL v. SOUTHAMPTON-SOUTH WEST
HAMPSHIRE HEALTH AUTHORITY II
In Marshall II, the Court of Justice, provided the Member
States with guidelines to be followed for the proper implementa-
tion of the Equal Treatment Directive.'4  The Court considered
whether Article 6 of the Directive barred Member States from
imposing a monetary limit on the damages available for a Mem-
ber State's violation of the Equal Treatment Directive.'" The
Court of Justice answered this question in the affirmative and
held that where a Member State chooses to provide monetary
damages for violations of the Equal Treatment Directive, a com-
ponent of that award must include an award of interest. 45
in the absence of implementing measures adopted within the prescribed time
limits, may be relied on by an individual in order to obtain specific compensa-
tion under the directive where, that is not provided for or permitted under
national law.
Id.
141. Id. at 1910-11, [1986] 2 C.M.L.R. at 454-55. Specifically, the Court ofJustice
stated:
Although [the Equal Treatment Directive], for the purpose of imposing a
sanction for the breach of the prohibition of discrimination, leaves the Mem-
ber-States free to choose between the different solutions suitable for achieving
its objective, it nevertheless requires that if a Member-State chooses to penal-
ize breaches of that prohibition by the award of compensation, then in order
to ensure that it is effective and that it has a deterrent effect, that compensa-
tion must in any event be adequate in relation to the damage sustained and
must therefore amount to more than purely nominal compensation.
Id.
142. Id.
143. Marshall II, Case 271/91, [1993] E.C.R. -, [1993] 3 C.M.LR. 293. For more
information on the factual background of MarshallfI, as well as a detailed analysis of the
holding, see Deidre Curtin, Case a-271/91, Marshall v. Southampton and South West Hamp-
shire Health Authority, [ "Marshall II"], 31 COMMON MKT. L. Rnv. 631 (1994).
144. Marshall II, [1993] 3 C.M.L.R. at 299.
145. Id.
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A. Procedural and Factual Histoy of Marshall II
Following the Court of Justice's judgment in Marshall 1,146
the case was remitted to the United Kingdom's Industrial Tribu-
nal.' 47 The Industrial Tribunal considered what damages Ms.
Marshall would receive as a result of the Health Authority's viola-
tion of the Equal Treatment Directive.148 The Industrial Tribu-
nal awarded Ms. Marshall damages that exceeded the statutory
limit, which had been imposed by the United Kingdom's Sex
Discrimination Act.
149
The Industrial Tribunal awarded Ms. Marshall £18,405,
which included a sum of £7700 for interest, as well as £1000 for
Ms. Marshall's emotional injuries. ° The £7700 award of inter-
est, however, exceeded the United Kingdom's national legisla-
tion, which imposed an upper statutory limit on the award of
damages available for persons adjudicated victims of gender dis-
crimination.' 5' The Industrial Tribunal found that despite the
Sex Discrimination Act's statutory limit, Article 6 of the Equal
Treatment Directive demanded that Ms. Marshall be given an
award of interest as a component of her compensatory dam-
ages.'52 The Industrial Tribunal held that Article 6 of the Equal
146. Marshall I, Case 152/84, [1986] E.C.R. 723, [1986] 1 C.M.LR. 688; see supra
notes 104-26 and accompanying text (discussing Marshall 1).
147. See Sex Discrimination Act, 1975, ch. 65, § 65(1) (granting Industrial Tribu-
nal jurisdiction to adjudicate employment discrimination cases). The Industrial Tribu-
nal is the United Kingdom's national adjudicator of labor disputes. Id. Pursuant to
Section 65(1) (b) of the Sex Discrimination Act, where an Industrial Tribunal finds that
the complaint is well founded, it shall, if it considers it to be just and equitable to do so,
make an order requiring respondent to pay compensation to the complainant. Id.
§ 65(1) (b). Most tribunals in the United Kingdom deal with cases in which an individ-
ual citizen is at issue with a government department or other public body concerning
his rights or obligations under a statutory scheme. 1 DOCUMENTS ON CONTEMPORARY
BRITISH GOVERNMENT. BRrrIsH GOVERNMENT AND CONSTITUTIONAL CHARGE (Martin Mi-
nogue ed., 2d ed. 1977). In most cases, there is an appeal to an appellate tribunal, a
minister, or the courts. Id.
148. Marshall 1, [1993] 3 C.M.L.R. at 299.
149. Id.; see Sex Discrimination Act, 1975, ch. 65, § 65(1) (b) (Eng.) (setting upper
statutory limit on damages available for victims of gender discrimination).
150. Marshall II, [1993] 3 C.M.L.R. at 299.
151. Id. The Sex Discrimination Act establishes an upper statutory limit for com-
pensation payable for violations of the Sexual Discrimination Act. Sex Discrimination
Act, 1975, ch. 65, § 65(2) (Eng.). Section 65(2) of the Sex Discrimination Act states
that "[t]he amount of compensation awarded to a person under subsection 1 (b) shall
not exceed the amount for the time being specified in paragraph 20(1) (b) of Schedule
1 to the Trade Union and Labour Relations Act 1974." Id.
152. MarshaUll II, [1993] 3 C.M.L.R. at 299.
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Treatment Direct had vertical direct effect even though the
Court of Justice, in Von Colson, held that Article 6 of the Equal
Treatment Directive did not have vertical direct effect.15 3
The Health Authority appealed the Industrial Tribunal's
award of interest.' The Employment Appeal Tribunall 5 re-
versed the Industrial Tribunal's holding and opined that be-
cause of the Sex Discrimination Act's statutory limit, Ms. Mar-
shall had no right to receive the interest awarded to her.15 6 The
Court of Appeal dismissed Ms. Marshall's appeal of the Employ-
ment Appeal Tribunal.'57 Ms. Marshall then appealed to the
House of Lords.15 8
The House of Lords then submitted a preliminary question
to the Court ofJustice' 59 of whether the upper limit imposed by
the Sex Discrimination Act governed Ms. Marshall's case, thus
precluding her from collecting the full amount the Industrial
Tribunal had awarded her.160 Specifically, the House of Lords
asked the Court of Justice a three part question. These ques-
tions were: (1) whether a Member State is guilty of failing to
implement the Equal Treatment Directive when that Member
State imposes an upper statutory limit on the amount of com-
pensation available to a victim of gender discrimination; (2)
when such a statutory limit does exist, whether it is essential that
the limit not be less than the amount of loss found to have been
sustained and whether there must be an award of interest on the
principal amount lost from the date of discrimination to the
date compensation is paid; and (3) whether, if an individual has
been the subject of unlawful discrimination, that individual is
entitled to rely on Article 6 of. the Equal Treatment Directive
against an authority that is an emanation of the Member State,
thereby overriding the statutory limit imposed by the Member
153. Id. at 325; see supra notes 50-53 and accompanying text (discussing direct ef-
fect of directives).
154. MarshallI, [1993] 3 C.M.L.R1 at 300.
155. Employment Appeal Tribunal Rules 1980, § 3 (Eng.) (amending Employ-
ment Protection (Consolidation) Act 1978, sch. 11(7) (Eng.)). The Employment Ap-
peal Tribunal is the appellate court of the Industrial Tribunal. Id.
156. Marshall II, [1993] 3 C.M.L.R. at 301.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id.; see supra note 107 (describing preliminary ruling procedures).
160. Marshall , [1993] 3 C.M.L.R. at 321-22.
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State's national legislation. 16 '
B. The Arguments Submitted to the Court ofJustice
The parties to the action, as well as the United Kingdom,
the Republic of Germany, and the Commission, submitted writ-
ten observations to the Court ofJustice. 6 Ms. Marshall and the
Commission urged the Court of Justice to find that the upper
statutory limit, imposed by the United Kingdom's Sex Discrimi-
nation Act, violated the Equal Treatment Directive.' 6- Con-
versely, the Health Authority, the United Kingdom, and the Re-
public of Germany urged the Court of Justice to find that the
statutory limit imposed by the Sex Discrimination Act con-
formed to Article 6 of the Equal Treatment Directive, as well as
the holding in Von Colson, because the award of damages pro-
vided a deterrent effect.1
6 4
161. Id. The House of Lords submitted the following questions to the Court of
Justice:
1. Where the national legislation of a Member State provides for the payment
of compensation as one remedy available by judicial process to a person who
has been subjected to unlawful discrimination of a kind prohibited by Council
Directive 76/207/EEC of 9 February 1976 ('the Directive'), is the Member
State guilty of a failure to implement Article 6 of the Directive by reason of the
imposition by the national legislation of an upper limit of £6,250 on the
amount of compensation recoverable by such a person?
2. Where the national legislation provides for the payment of compensation
as aforesaid, is it essential to the due implementation of Article 6 of the Direc-
tive that the compensation to be awarded:
(a) should not be less than the amount of the loss found to have been
sustained by reason of the unlawful discrimination, and
(b) should include an award of interest on the principal amount of the
loss so found from the date of the unlawful discrimination to the date
when the compensation is paid?
3. If the national legislation of a Member State has failed to implement Article
6 of the Directive in any of the respects referred to Questions 1 and 2, is a
person who has been subjected to unlawful discrimination as aforesaid enti-
tled as against an authority which is an emanation of the Member State to rely
on the provisions of Article 6 as overriding the limits imposed by the national
legislation on the amount of compensation recoverable?
Id. at 322.
162. See BERmANN Er AL., supra note 7, at 246. Once a preliminary ruling has been
requested by a Member State's national court, the Registrar of the Court ofJustice will
notify all Member States, the Commission, and the Council. Id. Each of the Member
States, as well as the Commission and the Council may then submit written observations
to the Court as well as appear at an oral hearing. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id.
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1. Ms. Marshall's Argument
Ms. Marshall contended that the preliminary questions sub-
mitted to the court raised the following issues. 165 First, Ms. Mar-
shall, pursuant to Article 5(1) and 6 of the Equal Treatment Di-
rective, had the right to an effective remedy against the state.'66
Second, the damages that the Sex Discrimination Act provided
her were inadequate in relation to the injury she suffered1 67
Ms. Marshall argued that Article 5 of the EC Treaty"6 em-
braces not only procedural rights but also substantive guarantees
such as effective remedies for the Member State's violation of
directives. 69 Thus, because the Sex Discrimination Act man-
dated that she be awarded less than the damages she actually
suffered, and hence failed to restore her to the position she
would have been in had the tortious act not been committed,
the objectives of the EC Treaty were not being fulfilled by the
Health Authority. 70 Specifically, according to Ms. Marshall, the
upper statutory limit jeopardized the EC's objective to attain
equal treatment of the sexes in the EC workforce. 17
In connection with this argument, Ms. Marshall stressed
that the purpose of the Equal Treatment Directive is to elimi-
nate gender discrimination in the EC workforce.172 The effec-
tiveness of the sanctions for Member States' violations of that
directive must, therefore, be equal to the damage actually sus-
tained by the victim of gender discrimination. 73 Thus, if na-
tional legislation provided that the remedy could be less than




168. EC Treaty, supra note 2, art. 5. Article 5 states:
Member States shall take all appropriate measures, whether general or partic-
ular, to ensure fulfillment of the obligations arising out of this Treaty or result-
ing from action taken by the institutions of the Community. They shall facili-
tate the achievement of the Community's tasks.
They shall abstain from any measures likely to jeopardise the attainment
of the objectives of this Treaty.
Id.






Equal Treatment Directive would not be met. 74 Likewise, the
requirement that the damages received for Member States' viola-
tions of the Equal Treatment must be effective, proportionate,
and dissuasive would also not be met.'75 According to Ms. Mar-
shall, the principle that a deterrent effect must be provided, cou-
pled with the purpose of the Equal Treatment Directive, de-
manded that the Court of Justice find that the upper statutory
limit imposed by the Sex Discrimination Act violated the Equal
Treatment Directive."'
2. The Commission Sides with Ms. Marshall
The Commission argued that although the preliminary
questions asked whether Article 6 of the Equal Treatment Direc-
tive granted Ms. Marshall the right to an effective remedy, in-
cluding an award of interest, the Court ofJustice should rely not
on Article 6 of the Equal Treatment Directive specifically, but
rather the Court should rely on the inherent right of the Com-
munity to impose remedies for the infringement of rights de-
rived from Community law.177 The Commission argued that Ar-
ticle 5 of the EC Treaty compelled Member States to take all
"appropriate measures" to ensure fulfillment of EC legisla-
tion.17  This obligation embraces the duty of a Member State to
create pecuniary remedies that are adequate in relation to the
damage sustained.179
174. Id.
175. Id. Ms. Marshall argued that the sanctions for breaches of Community rights
must be effective, proportionate, and dissuasive (the effectiveness principle). Id. In
particular, the sanctions must punish breaches under conditions, both procedural and
substantive, that are analogous to those applicable to breaches of national law of similar




179. Id. Specifically, the Commission argued that
although the preliminary questions refer to Article 6 of the Directive, the obli-
gation on a Member State to provide remedies for the infringement of rights
derived from Community law does not depend on the inclusion of Commu-
nity legislation of an express obligation such as Article 6 but is an obligation
inherent in the system of Community law. The Commission considers that the
obligation to provide effective remedies for the infringement of rights derived
from Community law is no more than the concrete application of the general
requirement of the results to be achieved and the obligation set out in Article
5 of the Treaty, that Member States are to take 'all appropriate measures' to
ensure fulfillment of their Treaty obligation. In that connection, [the Coin-
1994]
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The Commission's argument differed from the other writ-
ten observations submitted to the Court, because the Commis-
sion did not concentrate on whether Article 6 of the Equal
Treatment Directive was sufficiently precise to confer on it verti-
cal direct effect.' s0 Rather the Commission contended that the
obligation to provide an effective judicial remedy does not flow
from Article 6 of the Equal Treatment Directive,' but from Ar-
ticle 5 of the EC Treaty, which confers upon an individual the
substantive right to an adequate and effective remedy in the
event of a breach of the Directive by the Member State.'8 2 This
substantive right, according to the Commission, obligates Mem-
ber States to restore the individual to the position in which he
would have been had the discriminatory act not occurred.8 3
The Commission urged the Court that any other decision would
not provide a sufficient deterrent effect. 8 4
3. The Health Authority Argues that an Upper Statutory Limit
Conforms to the Equal Treatment Directive
The Health Authority argued that Article 6 of the Equal
Treatment Directive did not preclude a Member State from im-
mission] deduces that Member States remain free to determine the nature of
the redress to be provided. If a Member State opts for a sanction in the form
of compensation it must in any event be adequate in relation to the damage






184. Id. Specifically the Commission urged the Court of Justice to answer the
questions as follows:
1. General principles of Community law require that, where a Member State
chooses to implement Directive 76/207/EEC by providing for the payment of
compensation to individuals where their rights under the Directive are in-
fringed by their employer, the amount of compensation to be awarded should
be adequate in relation to the loss sustained by reason of the unlawful discrim-
ination and should not be significantly limited in its measure, quantum or
otherwise in such a way as to impair the effectiveness of the award of compen-
sation as a remedy for the loss sustained.
2. If the legislation implementing Directive 76/207/EEC has failed to imple-
ment fully the above requirement, a person who has suffered loss as a result of
a breach of a directly effective provision of the Directive by an employer which
is an emanation of the State has a right to be compensated on the terms set
out above by the State.
Id., (1993] 3 C.M.L.R. at 321.
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posing an upper statutory limit on damages available to victims
of gender discrimination." 5 Rather, the Health Authority ar-
gued that the United Kingdom's Sex Discrimination Act met the
obligations imposed by Article 6 of the Equal Treatment Direc-
tive by providing mechanisms that provided individuals with real
and effective judicial protection, as well as providing individuals
who are adjudicated victims of gender discrimination compensa-
tion." 6 Specifically, the Health Authority argued that the statu-
tory limit imposed by the Sex Discrimination Act was sufficient
to impose a deterrent effect on employers.'1 7 Further, accord-
ing to the Health Authority, the statutory limit conformed to the
Court of Justice's ruling in Von Colson'88 by providing "adequate
compensation in relation to the damages sustained."8 9
The Health Authority stressed that the Equal Treatment Di-
rective has no provision setting forth the amount of compensa-
tion to be awarded in cases of unlawful gender discrimina-
tion.190 Nor does the Directive provide any standard by which
the adequacy of the award of damages is adjudged.' 9' Rather,
the provisions of the Equal Treatment Directive are completely
discretionary. Thus, because the Equal Treatment Directive con-
tains no such provision, the only workable standard is that the
judicial protection afforded to individuals who are the victims of
gender discrimination must be an effective sanction with a dis-




188. Id. The Health Authority argued that it was clear from the Von Colson judg-
ment that the requirement that the sanction chosen by the Member State should be
such as to guarantee real and effective judicial protection and have a real deterrent
effect. Id.; see Von Colson and Kamann v. Land Nordrhein-Westfalen, Case 14/83,
[1984] E.C.R. 1891, [1986] 2 C.M.L.RL 430. It cannot be said that the remedies avail-
able under the Sex Discrimination Act are not a form of real and effective judicial
protection and it cannot be said that the compensation available is limited to a purely




192. Id. The Health Authority relied on Van Colson to support its view that Article
6 of the Equal Treatment Directive has no direct effect, in that Article 6 does not con-
tain any unconditional and sufficiently precise obligation that may be relied on by an
individual for discrimination sanctions. Id. According to the Health Authority, the
scope of the Von Colsonjudgment was limited to upholding the principle that Article 6
imposes on the Member States no obligation to apply a specific form of sanction. Id.
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urged the Court of Justice to find that the Sex Discrimination
Act, whose upper limit is increased frequently, conforms to the
Equal Treatment Directive.' 93
4. The United Kingdom Argues that the Sex Discrimination
Act Adequately Implements the Equal Treatment
Directive
The United Kingdom argued that the sole issue to be deter-
mined by the Court ofJustice was whether Ms. Marshall was enti-
tled to the sum of interest that the Industrial Tribunal awarded
her."9 4 According to the United Kingdom, because the Sex Dis-
crimination Act provided for the payment of compensation of a
victim of gender discrimination, it necessarily conformed to Arti-
cle 6 of the Equal Treatment Directive.' 95 Because Article 6 does
not require national legislation to include an award for interest
in respect of the relevant earnings lost, the United Kingdom may
so limit the amount of compensation awarded to a person ag-
grieved by gender discrimination. 96
The United Kingdom argued that Article 6 of the Equal
Treatment Directive provided the Member States with an ele-
ment of discretion when establishing the level of damages avail-
able for an infringement of rights specified by the Equal Treat-
ment Directive.' 97 Thus, as long as the national legislation con-
cerning the award of damages conformed to the decision in Von
Colson by providing an adequate remedy, the Member State had
effectively implemented Article 6 of the Equal Treatment Direc-
tive.' 98 The United Kingdom maintained that the upper limit
Rather, Von Colson illustrates the lack of direct effect in the Equal Treatment Directive
to recover compensation other than as provided by national law. Id. Accordingly, any
other approach would deny the United Kingdom (and other Member States) the dis-






197. Id. Specifically, the United Kingdom argued that "Community law defines
the rights which it considers worthy of protection, whilst the national legal systems en-
sure the protection of those rights within the framework of the procedural law and
remedies which secure protection of similar rights of purely national character." Id.
198. Id. Relying on the foregoing consideration, the United Kingdom observed
that Article 6 of the Equal Treatment Directive did not lay down a uniform law of reme-
dies or a uniform system of compensation, but allowed the Member States a margin of
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provided by the Sex Discrimination Act provided Ms. Marshall
with substantial, and not merely nominal, compensation in re-
spect of the monetary damages that she suffered as a result of
the Health Authority's discriminatory policy.'99 Thus, the
United Kingdom urged the Court ofJustice to hold that Article 6
of the Equal Treatment Directive has direct effect only where the
national legislation completely excludes a remedy for the unlaw-
ful discrimination. 00
5. The Federal Republic of Germany Agrees with
the United Kingdom
The German Government's argument concerning the di-
rect effect of Article 6 of the Directive was essentially the same as
the United Kingdom's. 2 0 1 Germany argued that Von Colson gave
Member States the freedom to choose between different solu-
tions. 2  The only nondiscretionary requirement imposed on
the Member States, therefore, is to provide a remedy that has a
real deterrent effect.2 03 Germany contended that the Sex Dis-
crimination Act does provide for an effective remedy with a dis-
suasive effect, and therefore, the Health Authority did not vio-
late any provision of the Equal Treatment Directive. 4
discretion regarding the range and nature of the judicial remedies to be made available
in order to sanction breaches of Article 3, 4, and 5 of the Equal Treatment Directive.
Id. That margin must nevertheless be in conformity with the criteria laid down by the
court in Von Colson and Kamann v. Land Nordrhein-Westfalen, Case 14/83, [1984]
E.C.RL 1891, [1986] 2 C.M.L.R. 430. Id. In other words, any sanction imposed must
guarantee real and effective judicial protection; it must also guarantee real deterrent
effect on the employer;, and the compensation must in any event be adequate in rela-
tion to the damage sustained. Id.
199. Id.
200. Id. The United Kingdom proposed that
Article 6 [of the Equal Treatment Directive] does not have direct effect re-
garding the specific sanction to be applied by a national court. It has direct
effect only where the legal protection for which it provides is totally excluded.
It follows that a person may not rely on Article 6 of the Equal Treatment Di-
rective against an emanation of a Member State to override limits imposed by
national legislation on the amount of compensation recoverable, where the
limit is no less favourable than that imposed on comparable claims of a purely
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In support of its argument, the German Government
pointed out that if the Court of Justice had considered that full
indemnification for the damages suffered was necessary in order
to implement the Equal Treatment Directive, the Court of Jus-
tice would have stated this in its Von Colsonjudgment.205 Thus,
the Court ofJustice's prior determination that the compensation
awarded must only be "adequate in relation to the damage sus-
tained" instead of delineating what compensation must be
given, compelled the Court of Justice to hold that Article 6 of
the Equal Treatment Direct did not have vertical direct effect
and, additionally, the Sex Discrimination Act's remedies were
sufficient.206
C. The Court of Justice's Holding
In Marshall II, the Court of Justice held that the imposition
of a statutory upper limit of an award of damages violated Article
6 of the Equal Treatment Directive. The Court opined that the
Sex Discrimination Act's imposition of a statutory limit, which
was considerably less than the actual damages suffered by Ms.
Marshall, violated the Equal Treatment Directive.2 0 7 The Court
205. Id.
206. Id. In part, the German government argued that the force of the deterrent
effect of a sanction may depend on the circumstances of the individual case and, in
particular, on the employer's financial means. Id. The legislature, however, cannot
take account of all circumstances of every conceivable case. Id. Accordingly, a genera-
lized approach must be adopted in determining the amount of the sanction, so that the
compensation awarded will deter an employer with normal awareness of the cost of
doing so from discriminating on the basis of sex. Id. Compensation such as that
awarded in the present case certainly would have a sufficient dissuasive effect to achieve
the objectives of the Equal Treatment Directive. Id.
207. Id. at 321. Specifically, the Court ofJustice answered the questions as follows:
1. The interpretation of Article 6 of Council Directive 76/207/EEC of 9 Feb-
mary 1976 on the implementation of the principle of equal treatment for men
and women as regards access to employment, vocational training and promo-
tion, and working conditions must be that reparation of the loss and damage
sustained by a person injured as a result of discriminatory dismissal may not be
limited to an upper limit fixed a priori or by excluding an award of interest to
compensate for the loss sustained by the recipient of the compensation as a
result of the effluxion of time until the capital sum awarded is actually paid.
2. A person who has been injured as a result of discriminatory dismissal may
rely on the provisions of Article 6 of the Directive as against an authority of the
State acting in its capacity as an employer in order to set aside a national provi-
sion which imposes limits on the amount of compensation recoverable by way
of reparation.
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held that Article 6 of the Directive does have vertical direct ef-
fect, and is violated when an individual receives less than the
actual damages suffered as a result of gender discrimination. °s
In reaching its decision, the Court of Justice looked to the
objectives of the Equal Treatment Directive. According to the
Court, Member States, in order to conform to the Directive,
must effectively implement the principle of equal treatment for
men and women in various aspects of employment, including
policies governing dismissal. 20 9 To this end, Article 6 imposes
on the Member States a duty to enable all persons who consider
themselves wronged by discrimination to pursue their claims via
the judicial process.210 This obligation, according to the Court
of Justice, implies that the measures in question be sufficiently
effective to achieve the objective of the Equal Treatment Direc-
tive. 211 The Court of Justice held that because this obligation is
nondiscretionary, Article 6 of the Equal Treatment Directive has
vertical direct effect.21 2 The Court opined that Article 6 of the
Equal Treatment Directive is an essential factor for attaining the
fundamental objective of the Equal Treatment Directive.213 Ac-
208. I& at 321. Advocate General Van Gerven stated that while Article 6 of the
Directive does have vertical direct effect, the imposition of an upper statutory limit on
the monetary damages available is not of itself unlawful. Opinion of Advocate General
Van Gerven, Marshall II Case 271/91, [1993] E.C.R. _, [1993] 3 C.M.L.R- 293, 311.
Regarding the direct effect of Article 6, Advocate General Van Gerven observed that
Article 6 has direct effect, on the ground that 'that article, construed in the
light of a general principle which it expresses,' is sufficiently precise and un-
conditional to be capable of being relied upon 'as against a member-State
which has not ensured that it is fully implemented in its internal legal or-
der'. ... [The] requirement to impose sanctions laid down by Article 6...
now also has direct effect as against the member-States, on the ground that the
principles of Community law on which that requirement is based, has in the
meantime likewise been defined sufficiently precisely in the Court's case law
Id. at 306-07. Concerning the upper statutory limit, Advocate General Van Gerven
stated that
to lay down national upper limits on compensation is, as Community law
stands, not unlawful. However, the precondition is that the limit should be
pitched high enough in order not to deprive the sanction of its 'effective, uni-
form, and deterrent' nature and does not prevent its being 'adequate in rela-
tion to the damage' normally sustained as a result of an infringement.
Id. at 311.
209. Id. at 323.
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cordingly, the Court of Justice held that the combined provi-
sions of Article 5 (1) and 6 of the Equal Treatment Directive give
rise to rights that an individual must be able to rely upon when
bringing a discrimination suit before his national court sys-
tem.2
14
The Court ofJustice held that in order for Member States to
conform adequately to the objectives in the Equal Treatment Di-
rective, the Member States must take the appropriate measures
to restore equality in those instances where discrimination has
taken place.215 This restoration of equality requires that either
the victims of the discrimination be reinstated to their previous
positions, or be granted financial compensation for the loss and
damage sustained.216 Where, however, financial compensation
is the measure adopted, it must adequately recompense for the
loss and damage actually sustained as a result of the discrimina-
tory practice and must be made in full accordance with the ap-
plicable national rules.211
Full compensation, therefore, for the loss and damage sus-
tained as a result of the discrimination, cannot exclude factors,
such as the passage of time, that may reduce the award's value. 218
The Court set forth several factors that the national courts must
follow when computing the damage sustained by an individ-
ual.21 9 Consequently, the award of interest is an essential com-
ponent of compensation for the purposes of restoring real
214. Id.
215. Id. at 325.
216. Id. The Court of Justice reached this decision by reading Article 6 of the
Equal Treatment Directive in conjunction with Article 5(1) of the Directive. Id. In
part, the Court ofJustice reasoned:
Such requirements necessarily entail that the particular circumstances of each
breach of the principle of equal treatment should be taken into account. In
the event of discriminatory dismissal contrary to Article 5(1) of the Directive, a
situation of equality could not be restored without either reinstating the victim
of discrimination, or in the alternative, granting financial compensation for
the loss and damage sustained.
Where financial compensation is the measure adopted in order to
achieve the objective indicated above, it must be adequate, in that it must
enable the loss and damage actually sustained as a result of the discriminatory








III. MARSHALL II STRENGTHENS THE IMPACT OF THE
EQUAL TREATMENT DIRECTIVE
The Court of Justice's decision in Marshall I was a surpris-
ingly liberal interpretation of Article 6 of the Equal Treatment
Directive. While the Court of Justice may have departed from
judicial principles and prior precedent, the granting of vertical
direct effect of Article 6 will greatly improve the efficacy of the
Equal Treatment Directive. The Member States now have spe-
cific guidelines concerning the amount of damages to which a
victim of gender discrimination is entitled as a result of unlawful
discrimination.
A. The Court ofJustice Ignored the Requirement that Articles of
Directives Must Be Sufficiently Precise to Have Direct Effect
Article 6 of the Equal Treatment Directive provides that
Member States shall construct a process whereby a person who
claims to been aggrieved by a discriminatory practice can have
his claim adjudicated.221 There is no mention of the damages
that an individual is entitled to receive if a Member State does
violate the Equal Treatment Directive.222 In Marshall , how-
ever, the Court ofJustice held that Article 6 was sufficiently pre-
cise, giving it vertical direct effect, and thereby allowing Ms. Mar-
shall to rely on it in her national court.225 Specifically, the Court
of Justice held that the actual damages sustained must be equal
to the award of damages, or the Member State will be in viola-
tion of Article 6 of the Equal Treatment Directive.224
The Court of Justice's ruling is surprising for two reasons.
First, the Court of Justice appears to have completely ignored
the requirement that in order for a directive to have vertical di-
rect effect its wording must be clear, unconditional, and nondis-
220. Id. at 324.
221. Equal Treatment Directive, supra note 22, art. 6, OJ. L 39/40, at 41 (1976);
see supra note 24 (quoting Article 6 of Equal Treatment Directive).
222. Equal Treatment Directive, supra note 22, art. 6, O.J. L 39/40, at 41 (1976);
see supra note 24 (quoting Article 6 of Equal Treatment Directive).
223. Marshall II, Case 271/92, [1993] E.C.R. _, [1993] 3 G.M.L.R 293; see supra
notes 207-20 and accompanying text (discussing holding of Marshall HI).
224. Marshall 1I, [1993] 3 C.M.L.R. 293; see supra notes 218-20 and accompanying
text (discussing inclusion of interest in damage awards).
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cretionary.225 Second, the Court of Justice rescinded Member
States' authority to provide for the damages available for dis-
crimination, an authority which had been expressly delegated to
them less than a decade ago.226
Regarding the abandonment of the requirement that the
directive provision be sufficiently precise, the Court of Justice
held that because Article 5(1) of the Equal Treatment Directive
was sufficiently precise, so too was Article 6.227 By its very terms,
Article 6 of the Equal Treatment Directive is discretionary. It
provides that ajudicial process, which is vested with the ability to
impose sanctions, shall be set up in the Member States' national
court system. Thus, the United Kingdom complied with the only
non-discretionary component of Article 6.228
The Court ofJustice's prior decision, in Von Colson,22 9 was a
more well-reasoned judicial interpretation of Article 6 of the
Equal Treatment Directive. The Court of Justice held that
although the damages paid must be more than a nominal
amount, the Equal Treatment Directive did not have a provision
regarding remedies that was sufficiently precise to create vertical
direct effect.2 0  Von Colson, however, did not provide the
strength that the Equal Treatment Directive needed, and thus
Member States could still profit from discriminatory practices.
The Court remedied this defect in Von Colson by stating that not
only must the damages received be adequate in relation to the
damage sustained but rather, the damages received must be
equal to the damage sustained.25'
The Marshall II decision, however, is troubling because it
may cause uncertainty among the Member States concerning the
adequacy of the legislation that they must implement to satisfy
225. See supra notes 78-84 and accompanying text (discussing "sufficiently precise"
requirement for directive provision to have vertical direct effect).
226. Von Colson and Kamann v. Land Nordrhein-Westfalen, Case 14/83, [1984]
E.C.R. 1891, [1986] 2 C.M.L.R. 430; see supra notes 131-42 (discussing holding of Von
Colson).
227. See supra note 209-14 (discussing Court ofJustice's reading of Article 5(1) and
Article 6 of Equal Treatment Directive together).
228. Sex Discrimination Act, 1975, ch. 65, § 63(1) (Eng.); see supra note 162 (set-
ting forth Sex Discrimination Act's judicial procedure).
229. Case 14/83, [1984] E.C.R. 1891, [1986] 2 C.M.L.R. 430.
230. Id.; see supra notes 131-42 and accompanying text (discussing Court of Jus-
tice's holding in Von Colson).
231. Von Colson, [1984] E.C.R. at 1891, [1986] 2 C.M.LRt at 430; see supra note 207(discussing Court of Justice's holding in Marshall I1).
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the Equal Treatment Directive. The United Kingdom enacted
the Sex Discrimination Act to conform to the Equal Treatment
Directive. The United Kingdom did afford individuals judicial
protection, as well as sanctions for those who unlawfully discrimi-
nate, but the British Act was still held to be in violation of the
Equal Treatment Directive. The practical consequence of this
decision is that each provision of a directive will have to be sub-
mitted to the Court of Justice, possibly several times, for the
Court to issue its binding interpretation.
Marshall IT is an excellent illustration of this arduous pro-
cess. The Equal Treatment Directive has been interpreted sev-
eral times and each time the reach of the Equal Treatment Di-
rective has increased. Thus, Member States, more than fourteen
years after the Council passed the Equal Treatment Directive,
are uncertain as to what legislative measures are adequate to
conform with the Equal Treatment Directive.
B. Marshall II's Contribution to the Equal Treatment Directive
The Court ofJustice's ruling in Marshall IT will enhance the
force of the Equal Treatment Directive. Member States will no
longer be able to employ discriminatory practices without incur-
ring financial penalties. Prior to Marshall 1, an employer could
have a discriminatory policy without incurring a financial hard-
ship if found guilty of discrimination. For instance, in the case
of Ms. Marshall the Health Authority may have found it more
profitable to dismiss her at sixty years of age, pay the sanction
circumscribed by the Sex Discrimination Act, and hire another
employee at a lesser wage. Thus, by requiring Member States to
reinstate the individual who has been a victim of discrimination
or repay that individual for lost wages, plus interest, employers
will be compelled to institute policies that guarantee the equal
treatment of the sexes.
The Court's most surprising articulation in Marshall 1 is
that a Member State will no longer be able to award compensa-
tory damages which are simply "adequate."2 2 Rather, the Mem-
ber States must provide for damages that are equal to the dam-
232. Marshall II, Case 271/91, [1993] E.C.R. -, [1993] 3 C.M.L.R. 293; see supra
note 207 (explaining that damages in gender discrimination cases must be equal to
actual damages sustained, as determined by Member States' national court).
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ages sustained.233 This pronouncement is surprisingly specific.
Each Member State's national court system, when awarding dam-
ages to the adjudicated victim of gender discrimination, must
now consider three enumerated factors before awarding the
damages. These three factors are: (1) the loss of physical assets;
(2) the loss of income; and (3) the damage accrued as a result of
the effluxion of time.2 4 This specificity will create greater uni-
formity in the damages awarded to individuals aggrieved by gen-
der discrimination. Further, Marshall II mandates that Member
States create a system whereby an adjudicated victim of gender
discrimination is awarded damages that are calculated on a case-
by-case analysis. This burden on the Member States' national
court systems, coupled with the financial penalties employers
may suffer, is a great impetus for Member States to implement
stricter gender discrimination laws. Consequently, a more level
playing field for the sexes in all of the Member States will be
achieved.
C. The Court ofJustice's Commitment to Eradicating Gender
Discrimination Continues with the Marshall II Decision
The inclusion of Article 119 in the EEC Treaty was a surpris-
ing articulation of a fundamental right,235 which the Court of
Justice has, throughout the Community's history, been commit-
ted to enforcing. In Deftenne v. Societe Anonyme Belge De Naviga-
tion Aerienne Sabena236 the Court of Justice articulated its firm
commitment to granting individuals the right to sue other pri-
vate individuals for violations of Article 119.231 This dedication
to the elimination of gender discrimination has continued, most
notably in Marshall I, where the Court noted that gender equal-
ity forms part of the "corpus of fundamental human rights."2 8
The Court's wide interpretation of equality legislation, and
233. Marshall , [1993] 3 C.M.L.R. at 293; see supra note 207 (explaining that dam-
ages in gender discrimination cases must be equal to actual damages sustained, as de-
termined by Member States' national court).
234. Marshall II, [1993] 3 C.M.LIR at 325. The Court ofJustice stated that "full
compensation for the loss and damages sustained as a result of discriminatory dismissal
cannot leave out of account factors, such as the effluxion of time, which may in fact
reduce its value." Id.
235. See supra note 6 (discussing inclusion of Article 119 in original EEC Treaty).
236. Case 149/77, [1978] E.C.R. 1365, [1978] 3 C.M.L.R1 312.
237. Id. at 1372, [1978] 3 C.M.L.R. at 313.
238. Marshall I, Case 152/84, [1986] E.C.R. 723, 743, [1986] 1 C.M.L.1. 688, 707.
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hence its protection of this fundamental right, continues in Mar-
shall if.
There is no doubt that the Court ofJustice engaged in judi-
cial activism to reach its conclusion in Marshall ff.2 9 Marshall H
illustrates that the Court ofJustice not only interprets the laws of
the Community, but also that the Court will enforce that legisla-
tion through its rulings. Prior to Marshall 1, the Court of Justice
had restrained itself from imposing sanctions for Member States'
violations of a directive. The Court ofJustice has now barred the
Member States from setting arbitary limits on awards for viola-
tions of the Equal Treatment Directive. Thus, the Court has es-
sentially taken all discretion away from the Member States in de-
termining what measures are necessary for the complete and ad-
equate implementation of the Equal Treatment Directive. The
Court's ruling that the Industrial Tribunal was obligated to disre-
gard national law in awarding damages is a principle the Court
of Justice had never articulated prior to Marshall 1. This pro-
nouncement will have far reaching effects not only in gender
equality cases, but also may be extended to cover other funda-
mental rights areas.
CONCLUSION
The Court of Justice, in Marshall II, engaged in judicial ac-
tivism to create a uniform application of the Equal Treatment
Directive by the national courts of the Community. The Court's
dedication to the elimination of gender discrimination is appar-
ent and the Court's actions should be applauded for providing
Member States with concrete guidelines concerning the sanc-
tions that must be applied against employers who engage in dis-
criminatory policies. The effect of the Court's specific guide-
lines concerning damages is that individuals who feel they have
been the victim of gender discrimination will more likely pursue
their claim. This incentive for plaintiffs to sue, coupled with the
deterrent effect of the Marshall II decision, ensures that Member
States will be more attentive when examining whether their em-
ployment policies are gender neutral.
239. See supra note 55 (defining judicial activism and discussing Court's history of
employing judicial activist philosophy).
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